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This thesis intends to uncover why critics have cited fusion centers at the national, 
regional, and state levels of the Intelligence Community (IC) for the inability to share 
intelligence. The research method examines three case studies: the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), and state and 
local fusion centers now combined into a National Network. All three case studies reveal 
how fusion centers at these various levels of the IC have been inhibited from sharing 
information because of three primary challenges: (1) the absence of a standardized model, 
(2) an insufficient concentration on counterterrorism (CT) as a mission, and (3) 
underdeveloped or missing external agency partnerships, although each challenge often 
affects each particular case study in different ways. For NCTC, external partnerships 
exhibit the most prevalent challenge at the national level; for EPIC, the diffusion of its 
mission creates the most difficult obstacle for it to overcome; and for the National Network, 
standardization precludes state and local fusion centers from sharing information while 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THE PRIMARY PROBLEM WITH FUSION CENTERS 
Upon recommendations from the 9/11 Commission, fusion centers were proposed 
as a solution to the difficulties and challenges of sharing intelligence for national, regional, 
and state and local agencies to use and access in a timely, efficient manner. However, even 
fusion centers that have been hailed as models of success, such as the El Paso Intelligence 
Center (EPIC), suffer from a lack of interagency investment and cooperation. This thesis 
asks the question: Why is it that fusion centers have suffered from sharing and cooperation 
problems they were specifically designed to overcome?  
B. WHY FUSION CENTERS EXIST 
The national and homeland security paradigm changed forever after the events of 
9/11. Released in 2004, the 9/11 Commission Report cited four kinds of failures that 
allowed Al-Qaeda to successfully attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon: failures 
of imagination, policy, capabilities, and management.1 All of these factors relate in some 
way to the Intelligence Community (IC) as a single entity and to problems related to sharing 
of information. To avoid debating the accuracy of the term failure—as Director of Central 
Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet vehemently denied an “intelligence failure” had occurred 
prior to 9/11—the term “deficiency” more fairly summarizes the commission’s findings.2 
It is still debatable, and perhaps even contentious, as to what these deficiencies resulted 
from. Nevertheless, it remains widely accepted that an inadequacy in the ability to share 
information contributed to the successful terrorist attacks in New York City and 
Washington, DC.  
                                                 
1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2011), 339.  
2 Hearing on National Security Threats to the United States, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of George 




After the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, American intelligence agencies 
devoted copious amounts of effort and resources to prevent another successful surprise 
attack on the U.S. homeland.3 Yet, the U.S. Government realized in the wake of 9/11 that 
intelligence institutions and practices needed to be examined once again. In its review, the 
9/11 Commission cited the IC for its inability to imagine the motives and scale of such an 
attack when it concluded that U.S. intelligence generated “no complete portraits of his [Bin 
Laden’s] strategy or of the extent of his organization’s involvement in past terrorist 
attacks.”4 The IC failed to provide to governmental leadership a comprehensive picture 
that relayed the serious nature of the threat that Al-Qaeda posed to U.S. national security.5 
Also, U.S. intelligence officials offered no substantial policy alternatives to either 
Presidents Clinton or Bush because they would have seemed disproportionate to the 
intelligence assessment of the threat at the time.6  
The 9/11 Commission also analyzed intelligence capabilities. The Commission 
found “the most serious weaknesses in agency capabilities were in the domestic arena. The 
FBI did not have the capability to link the collective knowledge of agents in the field to 
national priorities.”7 Finally, the Commission detailed how information was not shared 
properly, either in error or purposefully, and that intelligence became “lost across the divide 
separating the foreign and domestic agencies of the government.”8  
Could 9/11 have been prevented if the IC had performed more efficiently overall? 
Perhaps, but we will never be able to fully or fairly answer that question as only “after the 
event, of course, a signal is always crystal clear.”9 
                                                 
3 9/11 Commission Report, 346. 
4 Ibid., 342.  
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 349.  
7 Ibid., 352. 
8 Ibid., 353. 
9 Ibid.,, 339. 
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Yet, even this short analysis indicates that deficiencies did indeed exist prior to 9/
11, particularly with regard to intelligence sharing and organization. The 9/11 Commission 
Report summarized that, “The U.S. government must find a way of pooling intelligence 
and using it to guide the planning and assignment of responsibilities for joint operations 
involving organizations as disparate as the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, the military, 
and the agencies involved in homeland security.”10  
The American IC still remains intentionally decentralized, however. Encompassing 
17 executive government agencies and a $70 billion budget, the convoluted and often 
seemingly dysfunctional organizational model of the U.S. IC produces the benefits of an 
(a) overlap in strategic and tactical analysis, (b) specialized capabilities and resources, and 
(c) a certain amount of agency independence.11 Yet, within any bureaucratic organizational 
model, deficiencies do undoubtedly exist, and because of the particularly decentralized IC 
structure, the sharing of timely and relevant information poses a particularly steep 
challenge.  
Today, the IC has reorganized—at least to some degree. An over-arching Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence has been created, and a network of national, regional, 
and state and local fusion centers has been established to help bridge the gap between 
previously independent intelligence agencies, which aids in fostering a fully functional 
Information Sharing Environment (ISE). Many intelligence authorities argue that a 
collaborative IC that includes fusion centers remains one of the primary methods available 
that can help avert the next “9/11.” 
Academics, national security experts, and government officials, however, have 
critically analyzed these fusion centers and found them lacking. Despite investing large 
quantities of resources, fusion centers have been cited for failing to effectively share 
intelligence, while suffering from the same disjointed agency structure they were designed 
to unify and help bring cohesion to. If fusion centers do not perform as intended or help 
                                                 
10 9/11 Commission Report, 357. 
11 “U.S. Intelligence Community Budget,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, last 
modified June 12, 2017, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/ic-budget. 
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foster a collaborative intelligence environment, not only do they waste valuable 
resources—with regards to budgets, personnel, and capabilities—but perhaps even more 
alarming, the same intelligence gaps that contributed to the events of 9/11 could in large 
part, still exist.  
C. WHY FUSION CENTERS FAIL TO SHARE INFORMATION 
1. Critiques of Fusion Centers 
The literature already written regarding intelligence fusion centers originates from 
two principal perspectives: either applause for the efforts undertaken to establish a more 
formidable intelligence enterprise, or criticism of the failures of intelligence centers and 
their many shortcomings. A considerable majority of the literature reviewed remains 
critical of fusion centers, while only a small fraction of viewpoints can be counted as 
favorable. Critical statements of fusion centers and how they have “forwarded 
‘intelligence’ of uneven quality—oftentimes shoddy, rarely timely ... [and] occasionally 
taken from already-published public sources, and more often than not unrelated to 
terrorism,”12 significantly outnumber analysis that views fusion centers as having 
“improved consistency and standardization,” and aided in establishing “a common 
‘language’ across the National Network.”13 
From these two contrasting assessments—that levy criticism or much rarer 
applause—three key issues surface as principal disruptions to intelligence sharing by fusion 
centers: (1) the absence of a standardized model, (2) an insufficient concentration on 
counterterrorism (CT) as a mission, and (3) underdeveloped or missing external agency 
partnerships. These three issues have not only attributed to the critical viewpoints of either 
state or federal leaders or both, but they have also weakened these intelligence centers as 
                                                 
12 U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on 
Investigations staff report, Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers 
(Washington, DC: Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012), 1. https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/
download/report_federal-support-for-and-involvement-in-state-and-local-fusions-centers  
13 House Homeland Security Committee, Majority Staff Report on the National Network of Fusion 
Centers, July 2013, iv.  
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institutions and contributed to their inability to overcome intelligence sharing difficulties 
and U.S. intelligence network fragmentation.14  
2. The Absence of a Standardized Model 
Fusion centers at the national, regional, and state level do not inherit their structure 
or organization from any single model.15 David Carter and Jeremy Carter note that the 
desire for centralization suggests this lack of structure and formulaic design is a flaw.16 
However, the opposing viewpoint held by some members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives sees this same characteristic as an added bonus and an essential construct 
of a focused, region-specific intelligence organization.17 A House Majority Staff Report 
concluded that, “The strength of the National Network lies in individual fusion centers’ 
unique expertise; their independence from the Federal Government; and their ability to 
leverage the State and local perspective on behalf of the National homeland security 
mission.”18  
In sharp contrast, U.S. Senate findings detailed how a 2010 DHS assessment 
acknowledged “that a third of fusion centers had no defined procedures for sharing 
information outside of their walls, one of the primary reasons for their existence,” and that 
over 50 percent of fusion centers failed to establish procedures that outlined how to share 
intelligence they had received from federal intelligence organizations with other partner 
agencies.19 Matt A. Mayer of the Heritage Foundation believes these failures exist because 
                                                 
14 The term “fragmented” is borrowed from author Keith Cozine; Keith Cozine, “Fragmentation and 
Interdependency: Border Security Intelligence in North America and Europe,” The International Journal of 
Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs 18, no. 3 (November 21, 2016): 176. 
15 David L Carter and Jeremy G Carter, “The Intelligence Fusion Process for State, Local, and Tribal 
Law Enforcement,” Criminal Justice and Behavior 36, no. 12 (Dec, 2009): 1324.  
16 Carter and Carter, “The Intelligence Fusion Process,” 1327; Todd Masse and John Rollins, A 
Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for Congress, CRS Report No. RL34177 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/
metadc809679/. 
17 House Homeland Security Committee, Majority Staff Report, iv.  
18 Ibid. 
19 Senate Committee on Homeland Security, Federal Support for Fusion Centers, 86.  
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fusion centers exhibit a fundamental flaw in the way they are inherently designed.20 
Ambiguous lines of authority, combined with a lack of clear responsibility for oversight, 
compound the problem that begins when a new fusion center begins its operations with 
little to emulate.21 In many respects, fusion centers “suffer from a mandate that is too open-
ended and from guidelines that are too ambiguous,” only exaggerating the lack of 
standardization that many fusion centers suffer from.22 
Both of these divergent viewpoints have some merit. Nevertheless, in light of some 
of the serious concerns regarding this new intelligence venture, it seems that a more 
focused, centralized approach that still allows for creativity and flexibility would help 
define some of the structure that remains sorely needed.  
3. The Counter-Terrorism Mission  
Intelligence fusion centers evolved from the strong desire to patch a perceived 
“chink in the armor” related to domestic terrorism. Initially created to combat the ease with 
which potential terrorists could travel, transact, train, and plan their activities, debate 
continues over the role that fusion centers should continue to play now and in the future. 
The 2013 House Majority staff report summarizes that there have been five major 
successful domestic terrorist attacks since 9/11, not including the San Bernardino shootings 
in 2015 and the Orlando nightclub attack the following year in 2016.23 The report suggests 
that intelligence centers are partially responsible for preventing terrorist attacks and 
provide federal authorities with crucial access to information that allows law enforcement 
and homeland security operations to prevent such attacks.24  
                                                 
20 Tod Newcombe, “Fusion Centers Struggle to Find Their Place in the Post-9/11 World,” June 6, 
2013, para. 25–26 of 29, http://www.emergencymgmt.com/safety/Fusion-Centers-Struggle-Post-911-
World.html. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Torin Monahan, “The Future of Security? Surveillance Operation at Homeland Security Fusion 
Centers,” Social Justice, 37:2-3 (2010-2011), 87. 
23 House Homeland Security Committee, Majority Staff Report, iii.  
24 House Homeland Security Committee, Majority Staff Report, iv; Jessica Zuckerman, Steven P. 
Bucci, and James Jay Carafano, 60 Terrorist Plots since 9/11: Continued Lessons in Domestic 




However, the U.S. House of Representatives’ colleagues in the Senate again have 
held conspicuously different opinions regarding the success of intelligence fusion with 
regard to the prevention of terrorist attacks. In 2010, then DHS Undersecretary for 
Intelligence and Analysis Caryn Wagner argued fusion centers operated as “the linchpin of 
the evolving homeland security enterprise,” and “a major force multiplier.”25 But despite 
DHS’s assistance with establishing CT capabilities within fusion centers, a 2012 Senate 
report criticized DHS for the lack of evidence for such wide-spread claims of success, and 
instead argued that DHS support for fusion centers “has yielded little, if any, benefit to 
Federal counterterrorism intelligence efforts.”26 The Senate report summarized that the 
value of a majority of the terrorism-related reports that fusion centers generated “was 
questionable,” and detailed how 25 of the 62 fusion centers it reviewed gave no reference 
to terrorism or the prevention of terrorism in their mission statement.27  
These divergent opinions of the two bodies of the U.S. legislative branch indicate 
how a lack of primary purpose and the misunderstanding of whom intelligence centers 
work for, generally muddies the understanding of their purpose and diffuses the 
effectiveness of fusion centers as a whole. They were implemented as a response to 
terrorism, although “no two fusion centers seem to be exactly alike, either in form or 
function.”28 It seems that because of the unique approach that each center developed, many 
CT efforts quickly succumbed to “all-threats” and “all-hazards,” with only 15 percent of 
fusion centers reporting that their mission focused exclusively on counterterrorism.29 
According to one critic, Tod Newcombe, fusion centers have become “centers that 
communicate and analyze ‘all crimes’ and ‘all hazards.’ The result is more confusion than 
fusion,” however.30 Fusion centers “have evolved into very large (and sophisticated) crime 
                                                 
25 Senate Committee on Homeland Security, Federal Support for Fusion Centers, 26.  
26 Ibid., 27. 
27 Ibid., 32, 93.  
28 Michael German and Jay Stanley, What’s Wrong With Fusion Centers (New York: American Civil 
Liberties Union, 2007), 7.  
29 Robert W. Taylor and Amanda L. Russell, “The Failure of Police ‘Fusion’ Centers and the Concept 
of a National Intelligence Sharing Plan,” Police Practice and Research, 13, no. 2, (April 2012): 194. 
30 Newcombe, “Fusion Centers Struggle,” para. 7 of 29.  
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analysis and emergency response centers aimed at tactically reducing crime in a specific 
jurisdiction or providing internal statistical data for the [police] chief.”31 The focus on 
terrorism has fallen by the wayside, and regional threats to include: drugs, gangs, human 
trafficking, and natural disasters, have shaped and influenced these newly founded 
intelligence centers. Even as DHS has evolved and included terms like “resilience” and 
“cyberspace” in its core missions, preventing terrorism remains a foundational cornerstone, 
and this literature review suggests fusion centers should follow in this same path.32  
Critics of fusion centers believe a renewed focus on CT will not only serve as an 
avenue for securing much-needed federal funding, while simultaneously deterring mission 
creep—but also, it will provide a means by which to measure success.33 It is 
understandable that states and regions like New York and California (with the unique 
challenges that major urban cities such as New York City and Los Angeles present) might 
differ from the challenges that more rural states like Idaho or Nebraska might face. Yet CT 
contributions should remain a staple and core competency of intelligence centers, or 
plausible criticism will remain and the gaps in intelligence regarding future terrorist attacks 
will continue to exist unaddressed.  
4. Underdeveloped or Missing External Agency Partnerships 
Bureaucratic interests impede the abilities of intelligence centers to share the 
appropriate information with the correct organizations and personnel. Overcoming these 
interests proves to be difficult in everyday practice, however. Evidence suggests that 
intelligence fusion centers suffer from a lack of interest or partnership from federal law 
enforcement and homeland security agencies, despite the fact that “all of Washington’s 
‘new’ security initiatives are reliant on fusion-center technology to one degree or 
                                                 
31 Taylor and Russell, “The Failure of Police ‘Fusion’ Centers,” 188.  
32 “Our Mission,” Department of Homeland Security, last modified May 11, 2016, 
https://www.dhs.gov/our-mission. 
33 The Constitution Project, Recommendations for Fusion Centers, (Washington, DC: The 
Constitution Project, 2012), 19. https://constitutionproject.org/pdf/fusioncenterreport.pdf  
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another.”34 Collaboration problems surface when a “lack of uniform standards pertaining 
to coordination efforts arises” or can result because of a lack of trained “personnel 
resources, or agency buy-in.”35 Some fusion center employees can inhabit multiple 
simultaneous organizational roles such as FBI analysts also working as fusion center 
analysts, which as Torin Monahan points out, “Can lead to an understandable, but 
nonetheless problematic, blurring of professional identities, rules of conduct, and systems 
of accountability.”36 Former National Counterterrorism Center Director Michael Leiter 
testified to the House Committee on Homeland Security:  
People generally will share now, but they will generally share once they 
determine that something is relevant to a terrorism investigation that 
someone else might be able to help them on. And that’s too late. … You 
don’t know if it’s counterterrorism information until you have it, until you 
can compare it to other information and find connections between those 
dots.37  
Sharing information only when it might prove useful to the originating intelligence 
center contradicts the very purpose of what fusion centers are supposed to be all about.  
Fierce competition due to expanding egos and turbulent struggles for funding and 
resources between agencies and within organizational frameworks breaks down the 
fundamentals of the institutions they embody. In her book, Spying Blind, Amy Zegart 
analyzes the IC through the lens of organizational bureaucracy. She concludes that career 
incentives, agency loyalties, rational self-interest, and the nature of bureaucratic 
organizations, all produce intelligence agencies that inherently resist change or investment 
in organizations other than themselves.38 Even though fusion centers were installed to help 
                                                 
34 House Homeland Security Committee, Majority Staff Report, 15; U.S. General Accounting Office, 
Federal Drug Interdiction Efforts Need Strong Central Oversight, GAO/GGD-83-52 (Washinton, DC: U.S. 
General Accounting Office, 1983): 57, 62–63, 66; Anthony B. Newkirk, “The Rise of the Fusion-
Intelligence Complex: A Critique of Political Surveillance After 9/11,” Surveillance & Society, 8, no. 1, 
(2010), 54. 
35 Taylor and Russell, “The Failure of Police ‘Fusion’ Centers,” 195. 
36 Monahan, “The Future of Security?” 91. 
37 Michael Leiter, Former National Counterterrorism Center Director, testifying before the House 
Committee on Homeland Security, July 10, 2013, as quoted in House Homeland Security Committee, 
Majority Staff Report, 15. 
38 Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 90, 92–94, 96. 
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build bridges from one governmental agency to another, and assist in creating a perpetual 
stream of information, they simply cannot accomplish this facilitation without outside 
agency interaction and buy-in.  
5. Conclusions 
Interest in developing and establishing fusion centers exists because of the desire 
to facilitate information from the state, local, and tribal (SLT) level to federal agencies and 
vice versa. However, this review has indicated that intelligence fusion centers have not 
been able to provide this key capability as well as desired. Three primary reasons for this 
breakdown exist: (1) the absence of a standardized model, (2) an insufficient concentration 
on CT as a mission, and (3) underdeveloped or missing external agency partnerships. While 
much has been written about fusion centers, and many reports and articles focus at least on 
one of these three causal factors, this thesis proposes to investigate how all three relate, 
vary between different cases, and when combined, inhibit the functions required for fusion 
centers to operate as desired by their administrators.  
D. WHAT THE ANALYSIS REVEALS 
This thesis demonstrates how three primary factors—the absence of a standardized 
model, an insufficient concentration on CT as a mission, and underdeveloped or missing 
external agency partnerships—attribute to the ineffectiveness of fusion centers that have 
been consistently and negatively critiqued post-9/11. This thesis argues that eliminating or 
reducing these factors can improve the functionary practices of intelligence fusion and 
sharing operations. It also demonstrates how the combination of these factors contributes 
to the large, systemic breakdowns that have resulted following the establishment of fusion 
centers at various levels across the country. Any bureaucratic organization can be 
improved, and progress can always be made toward bettering a process or functionality. 
Yet, this thesis shows how these three factors prove to be the most devastating to the 




E. RESEARCH DESIGN AND CASE STUDIES 
The body of this thesis compares three case studies: (a) The National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), (b) The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), and (c) state 
and local fusion centers now combined into the National Network of Fusion Centers. These 
three case studies represent various categories of intelligence centers at the national, 
regional, and state/local levels. All three cases provide an opportunity to analyze the three 
factors this thesis attributes to the sharing and cooperation problems plaguing fusion 
centers. The availability of resources and scholarly work that examine these three 
institutions, as well as their importance to the overall U.S. intelligence enterprise, render 
them some of the best opportunities to critically examine the functionality, mission focus, 
and partnerships of each individual center. These three case studies offer the opportunity 
to search for evidence of intelligence sharing problems or departures from the critiques 
levied against fusion centers thus far.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis consists of five chapters. This introduction addresses the failures in the 
past of the fusion center concept to resolve the information sharing problems within the IC, 
and provides background on the importance of homeland security intelligence, fusion 
centers, and the reasons they exist. Chapter II examines the NCTC case and how it 
functions and which, if any, of the three characteristics proposed earlier it exhibits. Chapter 
III examines the EPIC case in the same manner and Chapter IV does the same for the third 
and final case study regarding state and local fusion centers. The conclusions in Chapter V 
synthesize the similarities and differences between all three cases studies and answer the 
original question by demonstrating how each of the three cases either exhibits or lacks the 
three symptoms of a dysfunctional intelligence institution and why. The conclusion also 
outlines recommendations for future research that could analyze any gaps uncovered or 































II. THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When President George W. Bush stated in his 2003 State of the Union address, 
“Tonight, I am instructing the leaders of the FBI, the CIA, the Homeland Security and the 
Department of Defense to develop a Terrorist Threat Integration Center, to merge and 
analyze all threat information in a single location,” he mandated the origins of what would 
soon come to be known as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).39 In the wake 
of 9/11, President Bush—along with many federal government policy makers—understood 
that good intelligence can often be the best option to defend against terrorism.40  
Since its establishment in 2004, however, NCTC has struggled with the three 
challenges that inhibit the sharing of intelligence: the absence of a standardized model, the 
counterterrorism mission, and underdeveloped or missing external agency partnerships. 
This chapter begins by providing background on the NCTC, including its inception, 
mission and functions, and structure. The following section will examine criticisms of 
NCTC, as well as the much rarer praise that it has received, to help understand how the 
organization has grown and developed. Next, the challenges of the lack of a standardized 
model, the CT mission, and underdeveloped external agency partnerships will be analyzed 
individually. The chapter will conclude with a summary regarding NCTC and its current 
role in the IC and explain how NCTC has taken strides to improve particularly in the area 
of external partnerships.  
                                                 
39 Office of the Press Secretary, “President Delivers ‘State of the Union,” The White House, last 
modified January 28, 2003, https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-
19.html 
40 Domestic Threat Intelligence, 112th Cong., 1st sess. (October 6, 2011) (statement of Dutch 
Ruppersberger, Ranking Member); Ruppersberger stated in his opening remarks on October 6, 2011, 




1. Executive Order 13354 
President Bush ordered the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) to be 
commissioned in May 2003, intending to “harmonize the efforts of various agencies.”41 
The CIA-led TTIC quickly evolved as a result of two key federal policy directives in 2004: 
Executive Order 13354 and The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
(IRTPA) of 2004.42 These policy changes resulted from the 9/11 Commission Report that 
took note in July 2004 of the various and unsynchronized efforts within the federal 
government attempting to sift through and analyze mountains of information hoping to 
transform it into understandable, actionable intelligence.43 The Commission reported that 
intelligence sharing prior to 9/11 had been “both inefficient and insufficient” and 
recommended a National Counterterrorism Center to replace the TTIC.44 What the 
commission really sought was a civilian version of a unified joint command for 
counterterrorism.45 Recognizing the intelligence gap that currently existed, President Bush 
exercised his national security powers and authorized Executive Order 13354 in order to 
establish TTIC immediately following the release of the publication of the 9/11 
Commission Report.46 Of note, EO 13354 instructed that the NCTC director be appointed 
by the DCI and did not “specifically constrain its [TTIC’s] operational authorities,”47 
granting it broad, operational powers and the ability to order other agencies to carry out 
operational tasks that Congress would later contract. 
                                                 
41 Col. Brian Reinwald, “Assessing the National Counterterrorism Center’s Effectiveness in the 
Global War On Terror,” (2007), 7; Justin Rood, “Threat Connector,” Government Executive 38 (April 1, 
2006): para. 2 of 40.  
42 Natalie Bloy and Heidi Peters, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2010), 1.  
43 Richard A. Best Jr., The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC): Responsibilities and Potential 
Congressional Concerns, CRS Report No. RL33539 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2010), 3.  
44 Bloy and Peters, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), 1; 9/11 Commission Report, 400–406. 
45 9/11 Commission Report, 403. 
46 Bloy and Peters, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), 1 
47 Reinwald, “Assessing the National Counterterrorism,” 7. 
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2. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act  
The U.S. Congress quickly followed up EO 13354 by opting to pass an intelligence 
legislative mandate of its own. Later during that same year, in December 2004, IRTPA 
(P.L. 108–458), establishing not only NCTC, but the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI) within which NCTC was placed.48 IRTPA differed and superseded 
EO 13354 in that it established how the director of NCTC would be appointed by the 
president with the U.S. Senate’s consent and report to the newly established DNI. However, 
as Richard Best writes in a Congressional Research Service report, “The position of the 
NCTC Director is unusual, if not unique, in government; he reports to the DNI for 
analyzing and integrating information pertaining to terrorism (except domestic terrorism), 
for NCTC budget and programs; for planning and progress of joint counterterrorism 
operations (other than intelligence operations) he reports directly to the President.”49 For 
practical purposes, however, the NCTC director coordinates with the National Security 
Council (NSC) and the NSC staff, rather than interacting with the president directly on a 
consistent basis.50 
IRTPA differed from EO 13354 in another unique way. EO 13354 proposed that 
NCTC should conduct strategic planning, as well as delineate tasks to other agencies and 
exercise operational control. IRTPA reduced these powers and mandated that NCTC bore 
responsibility for the government’s strategic planning in counterterrorism, but could not 
directly order other agencies to execute any of the plans it created, refining the role and 
mission of NCTC even further.51  
3. The Mission of NCTC  
In combination, EO 13354 and IRTPA direct NCTC to become the nation’s single 
agency responsible for planning counterterrorism strategy, while integrating, maintaining, 
                                                 
48 Best, The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), 4. 
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51 Reinwald, “Assessing the National Counterterrorism,” 7. 
 
 16 
and synchronizing all terror-related intelligence.52 NCTC interprets and summarizes its 
mission on its website as follows: “We lead and integrate the national counterterrorism 
(CT) effort by fusing foreign and domestic CT information, providing terrorism analysis, 
sharing information with partners across the CT enterprise, and driving whole-of-
government action to secure our national CT objectives.”53 
NCTC’s involvement in cases of domestic terrorism can be defined as convoluted 
with NCTC widely interpreting the law as a guideline to define its practices rather than a 
line not to be crossed with regard to its operations. Specific language exists to delineate 
that NCTC maintains no responsibility for intelligence “pertaining exclusively to domestic 
terrorists and domestic counterterrorism.”54 This language exists because of the desire by 
Congress to steer away from an agency that could be seen as yet another agency inherently 
designed to infringe on domestic privacy rights. An American “MI5” seems unpalatable to 
many members of government even after 9/11.55 NCTC leadership, however, seems to 
have a looser interpretation of the language in the law as reflected in NCTC Director 
Michael Leiter’s remarks to the American Bar Association in 2009: 
That distinction between the foreign and domestic, in almost every way, 
does not exist at this National Counterterrorism Center. Now it does exist 
in one very important way, and that is in the protection of civil liberties and 
the way in which different information is treated, because clearly, 
domestically collected information about U.S. persons and the like, or 
information collected overseas about U.S. persons, has to be protected and 
done very differently. And clearly the operations that collect that 
information are done very differently domestically or overseas. But the key 
point I want to get across is, today, when we look at threat information at 
the National Counterterrorism Center ... there is no distinction.56 
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Although the information and intelligence may be handled differently or with more 
protocol when it deals solely with American citizens, clearly NCTC feels compelled to try 
to integrate “all” intelligence related to terrorism that threatens both national and homeland 
security.  
4. The Functions of NCTC 
The core functions of NCTC do seem to directly correspond with the mandate given 
it by Congress and NCTC has positioned itself to confront all international terrorism 
issues.57 First, it maintains databases that manage the mountains of information collected 
by various agencies and organizations that allow for integrated analysis to be performed.58 
Second, it provides strategic analysis, often, in the form of coordinated assessments and 
CT intelligence reports to policymakers, but does not function simply as a tactical office 
attempting to eliminate individual terrorists as they pop up.59 NCTC’s analysis often 
focuses on terrorist locations, state-sponsored terrorist activities, CT cooperation with 
strategic partners, and specific terrorist groups or regional issues.60  
5. The Structure of NCTC 
The structure of the NCTC embodies some inherent design flaws, however. First, 
starting with the position of director, the dual reporting channels that Congress has 
allowed—one to the DNI and another directly to the president—confuses who the NCTC 
director should be directly reporting to. As Richard Best concludes, “These unusual dual 
reporting responsibilities might lead to a situation in which the NCTC director could 
recommend policies to the President specifically opposed by the DNI.”61 Congress did 
specify the context of what the director should be approaching either the DNI or president 
                                                 
57 Domestic Threat Intelligence, 112th Cong., 1st sess. (October 6, 2011) (statement of Matthew Olsen, 
NCTC Director).  
58 Bloy and Peters, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), 1. 
59 Olsen, testimony on Domestic Threat Intelligence. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Best, The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), 5. 
 
 18 
about, but the possibility for conflict or incoordination on such pressing national security 
matters seems unwise. As Col. Brian Reinwald proposes, “This authority to report directly 
to the President provides a great deal of potential interagency authority and power for the 
director ... [but] the NCTC director should not be placed in a position of potential disloyalty 
or insubordination with his immediate superior in order to exercise his authority.”62 The 
way that the position has been diagramed by Congress seems to be working thus far, but 
success up to this point might be subject more to amiable personalities than doctrinal chains 
of command.  
The real structure of the NCTC does represent the mission and functions of this 
fusion center. Four separate directorates—Strategic Operational Planning, Intelligence, 
Terrorist Identities, and Operations Support—directly support the foundational concepts 
that NCTC was implemented upon. NCTC employs nearly 1,000 personnel to include some 
600 analysts that work as permanent staff or come from rotating augments from other 
agencies.63 Individuals that work for other “parent” agencies provide beneficial expertise 
and “a fresh set of eyes,” but come with some inherent challenges as well. These challenges 
can include loyalty to their parent organization, vice NCTC, or they may be of a lower 
caliber or inexperienced if they are volunteered to NCTC from their home agency.  
C. REVIEWS, CRITICISM, AND SUPPORT FOR THE NCTC 
Like many other government entities, NCTC has received its fair share of criticism 
as a result of the analysis of its performance. To be fair, not many authors or scholars find 
it worthwhile to exclusively applaud an agency’s efforts. As Richard Best writes, “[I]in 
many cases the successes go unreported while the failures are trumpeted.”64 Yet, the more 
substantial and impartial critiques of NCTC cannot be ignored.  
One of the most critical reviews of NCTC comes from Col. Brian Reinwald writing 
in 2007 for a research project for the Army War College titled, “Assessing the National 
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Counterterrorism Center’s Effectiveness in the Global War On Terror.” In his analysis, 
Col. Reinwald proposes that, “More than two years since its inception, however, the NCTC 
has arguably achieved neither an acceptable level of effectiveness or efficiency in 
performing its intended role.”65 Content with serving as an intelligence repository, NCTC 
“demonstrate[s] a seeming unwillingness to take a bold implementation approach and a 
preference to avoid bureaucratic conflict.”66 Col. Reinwald points out that NCTC’s vision 
“inauspiciously paints a picture of a non-confrontational think tank that identifies issues, 
and attempts to merely influence the greater governmental efforts against 
counterterrorism.”67 He argues that NCTC willingly shrunk away from the original and 
unprecedented role as the nation’s premier CT organization. Col. Reinwald concludes that 
NCTC’s attitude “does not capture the literal roles and mission assigned by Congress, to 
plan, to integrate, delineate responsibility, and monitor.”68 
Others have criticized NCTC as well, especially in the aftermath of the failed 
Christmas Day bombing on December 25, 2009, on Northwest Airlines Flight 253.69 A 
Congressional Research Service report about NCTC details how the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) concluded that the IC failed to identify the perpetrator 
of this attack because of “systematic failures” throughout the IC network to include 
NCTC.70 Researchers Natalie Bloy and Heidi Peters note that the SSCI cited NCTC in its 
investigation with “inadequate organization’ to carry out its mission of analyzing and 
integrating all intelligence pertaining to terrorism and CT.”71 U.S. Air Force Colonel 
Daniel Putbrese came to a similar conclusion. In his paper, “Intelligence Sharing: Getting 
the National Counterterrorism Analysts on the Same Data Sheet,” he argued that as a fusion 
center, “NCTC is to ‘ensure that agencies, as appropriate, have access to and receive all-
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source intelligence support needed to execute their counterterrorism plans or perform 
independent, alternative analysis.”72 He concludes that a majority of federal CT agencies 
do not have access to the information and data that they require to do their jobs and provide 
analysis to transform this information into usable intelligence.73  
The analysis and discussion of NCTC is not completely one-sided, however. The 
ranking member of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Intelligence, Dutch 
Ruppersberger, praised NCTC for helping transform the IC from a “need to know’ culture 
… to a responsibility to share.”74 He noted in his remarks that terrorist plots have been 
foiled because of the integration within the IC. Richard Best asserts that several members 
of Congress “have taken note of NCTC’s ability to gather information from a variety of 
agencies,” and integrate that information in order to “synchronize the elements of national 
power.”75 President Bush’s administration applauded NCTC for its job performance and 
President Obama during a visit to NCTC in October 2009 stated, “It’s clear to see—that 
you are one team—that you are more integrated and more collaborative and more effective 
than ever before.”76 Richard Best assesses that from the information available to the public 
through unclassified sources, NCTC appears to be structured, resourced, and authorized to 
fulfill its intended mission.77  
When considering both viewpoints, certainly substantive criticism cannot be simply 
dismissed by the remarks of a visiting president to analysts certainly awaiting and 
expecting his compliments. Yet some consideration should be given to the factors 
surrounding the harshest and earliest criticisms of NCTC. While some of the fiercest 
condemnation written regarding NCTC came in the years immediately following the 
establishment of NCTC in 2004, to expect any new federal addition to function seamlessly 
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within a one-or-two-year period seems unrealistic given the bureaucracy and growing pains 
involved with such an endeavor. Second, many criticisms have come from individuals 
writing about NCTC who hold no previous first-hand experience with it. This conjecture 
is not made to discredit comments or analysis made by individuals who may have no direct 
experience with the subject of their study, but reality often becomes shaded when direct 
interaction with the people, dilemmas, and road-blocks particular to a specific institution 
has been excluded.  
The rest of this chapter examines the three key challenges of fusion centers with 
respect to NCTC in an effort to determine if these challenges remain a problem for NCTC, 
and if so, to what degree and why? 
D. THE LACK OF A STANDARDIZED MODEL 
Examining NCTC with regards to the lack of a standardized model offers a unique 
challenge because NCTC, realistically, had to become the standardized model for other 
intelligence fusion centers to follow with regards to CT. Prior to 9/11, while certain 
intelligence entities already existed and most analyzed information to create and utilize 
intelligence, in large part, they performed this function within their own disparate 
organizations and for their own purposes. These different agencies only shared their 
intelligence with each other when requested or when forced to by a higher rung on the IC 
ladder.  
Early in its history, NCTC exhibited characteristics that demonstrate how an 
intelligence fusion center can suffer without a specific structure (i.e., a standardized model) 
to support its functions. Col. Brian Reinwald observed early in 2007 that NCTC failed to 
“capture the literal roles and mission assigned to it by Congress, to plan, integrate, delineate 
responsibility, and monitor.”78 In short, it failed to function as an intelligence fusion center, 
designed to both analyze and share intelligence with other agencies in order to facilitate 
and synchronize different capabilities and elements of national power—its direct charter. 
NCTC struggled without a “clearly delineated decision making process” which remained 
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subject to its ability to “refine and improve internally as a first priority.”79 After two years, 
NCTC remained “in the early stages of developing procedures for the operational 
integration of interagency actions.”80 A 2005 study conducted to assess the IRTPA 
reported, “The bifurcated reporting relationships the act outlines for the director of the 
NCTC, ill-defined distinctions between types of operations, as well as the authority of 
NCTC to define operational success ... are all areas in which unclear authority could lead 
to inefficient business practices.”81 Because of the unprecedented nature of the task at 
hand, NCTC endeavored to fill the void that required a national terrorism fusion center. At 
least initially, NCTC suffered from a lack of standards and a design that could not bring to 
fruition the end-state goal of analyzation, integration, and strategic planning with regards 
to CT for the U.S. Government.  
NCTC evolved originally from TTIC, which originated from and was housed by 
the CIA and was widely recognized as a CIA-led organization. The CIA, however, includes 
a much more extensive history of guarding information rather than sharing it.82 While 
NCTC developed from the foundation of an intelligence center comprised of undoubtedly 
some of the best men and women from the CIA, FBI, and DHS, these individuals, however, 
served to primarily keep their own respective agencies protected and informed, rather than 
necessarily integrate all analysis—or practice anything that could be considered 
“fusion.”83  
Early on, NCTC could not take advantage of a standardized model because its 
mission and function were unprecedented. NCTC needed to be more than an intelligence 
center where analysts from different organizations and agencies sat side by side, yet 
accessed different databases and forwarded their conclusions through different networks 
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and chains of command. Rather, NCTC now needed “to be the model that can ultimately 
lead the way for the other national CT centers,” while supporting “equal access” to support 
its mission.84 Too little information either currently exists or is inaccessible to conclude 
definitively whether or not NCTC functions as the model for fusion centers to emulate. But 
even after one of its most critical “failures” following the attempted Christmas Day 
bombing by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab during a passenger flight approaching Detroit, a 
review by the Obama Administration revealed that NCTC had not failed to share or collect 
information, but rather, the incident had occurred due to “inadequate analysis.”85 This 
conclusion indicates that NCTC functions as intended by IRTPA and EO 13354, but that 
simple analytic practice, rather than form, function, or mission, was more to blame than 
anything else.  
E. COUNTERTERRORISM AS A MISSION 
NCTC has fared better than many other intelligence fusion centers with regard to 
its mission focus, in that, it remains free to concentrate on CT. As will be seen later in the 
following case studies, other fusion centers have been tasked with focusing their analysis 
on a wide-range of threats from crime and drugs to even infrastructure protection. Yet, 
NCTC has always been allowed to singularly focus on terrorism. As Reinwald states, “As 
directed by the President, the NCTC’s major functions were to serve as the primary 
organization in the U.S. Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence 
pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism; conduct strategic operational planning for 
counterterrorism activities, to include the integration of the instruments of national 
power.”86 At first appearances this section should be rather short and analysis of NCTC 
and its CT mission seems unnecessary.  
It would be an oversight, however, to not take note of how NCTC has still struggled 
with the subject of mission and how it has evolved even with the advantage of CT being 
its primary and only effort. The United States Government’s strategy for combatting 
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terrorism changed in 2006 and challenged NCTC’s ability to adapt its CT mission to 
encompass a new strategic imperative. Going back to 2003, the National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism defined the enemy as “terrorism” itself. The strategy at the time was 
to “stop terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests, and our friends 
and allies around the world.”87 This strategy intended to use instruments like NCTC to 
accomplish the end state of defeating terrorism in its entirety. 
However, in 2006—after the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan—a new strategy 
written largely by the same Bush administration, asserted that the United States now found 
itself in a war with a “transnational terrorist movement fueled by a radical ideology of 
hatred, oppression, and murder.”88 This new strategy embraced the establishment of 
democracies and promoted institutions and the countering of terrorist ideology.89 As Col. 
Reinwald pointed out in 2007, the strategy for the GWOT had changed, which “for the 
NCTC, this strategy signifies[d] that its planning, integration, and monitoring function for 
U.S. GWOT counterterrorism activities have been greatly complicated and expanded, 
however, without a parallel increase in directive or execution authority.”90 Reinwald later 
in his paper criticized NCTC for its “lethargic culture” and its inability to adapt to a mission 
that was evolving because of a stagnant bureaucratic atmosphere.91 
Reinwald is not the only writer to find fault with latent bureaucracy and the failure 
of governmental agencies to adapt their practices to a new or changing mission. Amy 
Zegart attempts to understand the precise reason why 9/11 occurred, and writes in her book 
Spying Blind, “that the answer lies in organizations, more specifically, in the deeply rooted 
organizational weaknesses that have afflicted U.S. intelligence agencies for decades and in 
the enduring impediments to fixing them.”92 Zegart reports that both the 9/11 Commission 
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and the House and Senate Intelligence Committees Joint Inquiry concluded, “The 
Intelligence Community’s fragmentation, inability to set priorities, poor human 
intelligence capabilities, and information sharing deficiencies created a dysfunctional 
intelligence apparatus that was incapable of penetrating the al Qaeda plot.”93 More 
specifically, Zegart reveals in her book that two well-established federal agencies—the FBI 
and the CIA—both failed to adopt or adapt their CT mission in a post-Cold War era that 
left them vulnerable to a shadowy, murky threat like al-Qaeda.94 Spying Blind illustrates 
how difficult it can be for a well-established, functional government agency to adapt its 
mission to a new threat or strategy. All the more difficult, for a new, fledgling agency like 
NCTC to try to adapt just a short time after beginning intelligence operations in the wake 
of what was already a turbulent time within the IC in the decade following 2001.  
Yet, NCTC seems to have taken strides to improve its focus on the mission of CT, 
in new, more prevalent ways. Critics have argued that the U.S. strategy has previously 
focused too much on just killing and disrupting actual terrorist activities and their 
organizations, and focused too little on countering the ideology—preferring rather to opt 
for the nail and hammer method. In 2009, then Director of the NCTC, Michael Leiter 
directly illustrated how NCTC had changed the way it went about accomplishing its 
mission and found itself now “combating the ideology and combating the root causes. 
NCTC has poured more resources into this area than anything else over the past two years, 
ensuring that we understand the motivating factors behind violent extremists and then 
trying to craft whole-of-government solutions for attacking those in a targeted way.”95 
Leiter remarked how seeing a threat emanate from anywhere in the world can have an 
effect anywhere in the United States, and the best way to prevent that threat from coming 
to fruition is to share information in order to “uncover any possible links … to understand 
where that threat may ultimately manifest itself.”96 Because of the unique position that 
NCTC occupies it now allows “the best analysts across all of our unique counter terrorism 
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agencies [to look] ... at the best intelligence possible there by bringing all the relevant 
perspectives to bear on the problem set. It is in this way that the IC will team together to 
‘connect the dots.”97 NCTC has correctly modified it mission to adapt to new strategies, 
but retained the central core of CT at the heart of everything NCTC intends to accomplish.  
F. UNDERDEVELOPED OR MISSING EXTERNAL AGENCY 
PARTNERSHIPS 
With regards to external partnerships, NCTC has struggled with legacy IC issues 
that surface regularly when disparate government organizations are forced to work 
alongside one another or need to work together to accomplish a common goal. Forging 
strong two-way partnerships that mutually benefit each affiliate have historically 
challenged government agencies in the past and continue to do so still today. America’s 
history is fraught with tense frictions and complicated lines of effort that often lead to 
competing priorities for government resources.98 For example, during World War II, 
interagency coordination and synchronization between the Departments of State and War 
proved to be a monumental challenge.99 Of the three key challenges to fusion centers, 
partnerships has indelibly proved to be the greatest of these challenges for NCTC.  
Without strong, beneficial partnerships with agencies such as DHS, the FBI, and 
the CIA, as well as the SLT law enforcement community, NCTC cannot perform its 
functions or accomplish its mission and prevent terrorism. Whether NCTC serves as a 
single, unified counterterrorism intelligence center, however, has been debated. In 2007, 
Col. Reinwald criticized NCTC for its “preference to avoid bureaucratic conflict” with its 
effectiveness “dependent upon willing interagency compliance and cooperation.”100 The 
purpose of NCTC is to both analyze and integrate intelligence for the whole of government 
use, and without strong, willing partnerships with other agencies and levels of government, 
NCTC as a fusion center simply cannot effectively share the information that it needs to.  
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However, as with the other two previous sections—which examined the lack of a 
standardized model and the mission of CT—it seems that overall, NCTC has made 
substantial improvements in the area of partnerships and real, tangible progress has been 
made in this area. Serving as the acting NCTC Director, Michael Leiter stated, “The 
talented men and women who work at NCTC perform a unique and vital service to the 
nation, and NCTC has benefitted from the integration of analysts and planners from across 
the intelligence community, the U.S. military, and other federal, state, and local 
partners.”101 According to Director Leiter, not only has NCTC been able to use these vital 
partnerships to help “provide its vital service to the nation,” but even more so, NCTC has 
directly benefited itself as an effective organization from the relationships it has established 
since its inception in 2004. The remainder of this section will be dedicated to examining 
with regards to NCTC both the problems, as well as the solutions NCTC has encountered 
and the fixes emplaced to deal with the challenge of key and willing IC partners.  
1. NCTC’s Partnership Problem 
NCTC has dealt with three “sub-problems” with regards to external agency 
relationships. Initially, NCTC did not receive the participation it needed to effectively 
coordinate the United States Government’s CT effort. First, it has had to deal with 
competing agencies concerned primarily with their own self-interests. Second, it has had 
to be concerned with individual analysts themselves and finding the right people from these 
other external agency partners. And third, NCTC has little authority to compel the actions 
and results it needs from both the individuals and the parent agencies these individuals are 
borrowed from. 
a. Competing Agencies 
Immediately upon its inception, NCTC had to confront special conflicts with the 
CIA and the FBI, which it desperately needed as these two agencies primarily had been 
charged with the CT mission domestically and overseas. Beginning with the CIA, Col. 
Reinwald proposed in his paper that the NCTC director needed to shore up NCTC’s 
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interagency reputation in order to “improve an admittedly poor relationship between the 
director and the CIA.”102 Specifically, this “poor relationship” refers to John Brennan’s 
contentious position as leader of TTIC as it was established, and how he confronted both 
the CIA and the FBI in their unwillingness to turn over information to this fledgling, 
unknown intelligence enterprise he now found himself at the helm of.103 Brennan’s lengthy 
background at the CIA made the FBI wary of him and created a CIA expectation of 
preferential treatment by him and his new, fledgling center.104 Undeterred, Brennan 
insisted TTIC—and later the NCTC—have access to both CIA and FBI networks and 
information.105 This problem cannot be dismissed as a mere conflict in personalities. 
Brennan’s replacement, retired Navy Vice Admiral John “Scott” Redd, candidly remarked 
that the interagency conflicts affecting NCTC “never goes away,” and admitted that his 
fusion center’s relationship with other agencies remained strained: “I won’t tell you that 
everything’s rosy.”106 
Also, Col. Putbrese reached a similar conclusion to Col. Reinwald regarding 
agencies and their analysts working with NCTC. Putbrese cited in his research, “Those 
with the best access are almost exclusively reserved for those analysts that came to the 
NCTC from the CIA,” and how “this author [Putbrese] received testimonials that CIA 
circumvented non-CIA analysts serving in NCTC from having access to CIA’s unreported 
terrorism data.”107 Col. Putbrese concludes, “All too often, the collecting agency views the 
data collected as an end in itself rather than as information that requires all source analysis 
to help uncover terrorist plots.”108 Clearly, NCTC’s overall relationship with other 
agencies has been lacking because of competition and the self-interest of the “partner” 
organization, and perhaps to some degree understandably so. In Spying Blind, Amy Zegart 
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credits organizational theory and the tenets of (1) rationality, (2) structure, and (3) the 
passage of time, as all understandable and heavily entrenched elements of why new, 
instrumental changes (like the creation of NCTC) can be so heavily resisted by the “old 
guard” and established institutions within any enterprise.109  
b. The Right People 
Individual people and analysts serving as the staff for NCTC also share some of the 
responsibility for the strained relationships that the center has had to work through and 
confront. These individuals pose two challenges: inexperienced, unqualified, or “tainted” 
intelligence analysts or staff, and those individuals who maintain loyalty to their parent 
agency even after being detailed to NCTC for a specific period of time. TTIC received its 
original staff from whomever the participating agencies decided to send on-loan. Given the 
already previously discussed competition and rifts between the competing agencies, John 
Brennan did not expect to receive the most talented analysts from each partner 
organization.110 His expectation was met with the “bell curve that was on the left side of 
the experience spectrum.”111 
Brennan and others’ concerns about staffing were well-founded. Research showed 
that the positions within the four NCTC directorates remain staffed “with ad hoc 
representation from across the interagency, most of who are detailed on a non-permanent 
basis, and still ultimately responsible to their parent entities.”112 In several interviews Col. 
Putbrese conducted, he asked intelligence officials what the key issue that remained in 
place that made data access and information sharing so difficult to achieve: “The answer 
was almost always the same: ‘information is power.’”113 Analysts want credit and they 
need to promote themselves to both further their career and further their marketability and 
potential compensation increases and rewards. NCTC likely will not promote them, but 
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their home organization will. It is much more likely to do so when officials and leadership 
back at the CIA or FBI as examples, see the direct contribution made by their analysts at 
NCTC that further the CIA or FBI’s results or reputation, not the NCTC’s.  
c. Lack of Authority 
NCTC in the past has lacked the executive authority to leverage partners to turn 
over data and qualified personnel it needs to establish itself as a functional and over-arching 
federal CT coordinator.114 As a new executive agency created within a newly established 
ODNI, NCTC deeply lacked the authoritative power required to find and obtain analysts 
from partners such as the FBI and CIA that would best serve the interests of NCTC, or to 
find partner agencies willing to turn over and share some of their most sensitive 
intelligence. Creating a two-way street for information sharing requires an NCTC director 
with the power to compel other agency directors to offer some of their best people by 
showing the benefits of mutual cooperation to NCTC, the partnering agency, and the 
overall national security of the United States.  
2. NCTC Partnership Achievements and Solutions 
Instead of trying to bypass or side-step the interagency struggles it originally 
confronted and hoping to achieve its ends through the means of serving as a “non-
confrontational think tank,” NCTC needed to break down the traditional boundaries and 
weaken the institutional bias to the point that, at a minimum, real mutual relationship 
breakthroughs seemed achievable. Of course, this end-state—while plausible—still 
remains difficult to achieve in its entirety. As the 9/11 Commission reported on the 
problem: “It is hard to ‘break down the stovepipes’ when there are so many stoves that are 
legally and politically entitled to have cast-iron pipes of their own.”115  
NCTC benefits the nation by fostering partnerships and sharing information, which 
alone presents the best possible method for preventing another catastrophe like 9/11. 
Without these core functions, NCTC provides little benefit to the IC and the overall CT 
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mission, and neither can it achieve its mission or function as a fusion center. While perhaps 
not fully recognized or achieved, NCTC has taken great strides in producing relationships 
with other government agencies and law enforcement institutions at different levels of 
government that benefit the CT effort through planning, synchronized analysis, and 
information sharing.  
The divisions of information within the United States Government that the 9/11 
Commission reported upon in its conclusions have been greatly reduced or eliminated. 
NCTC has served as part of the solution. NCTC Director Michael Leiter reported in 2009:  
The basic division that we had between intelligence, law enforcement, the 
military and the diplomatic world fundamentally, in terms of information-
sharing relating to terrorism, does not exist today. There are still limitations, 
again, associated with legitimate protections of information civil liberties, 
but fundamentally, those walls or boundaries have been eliminated.116 
He cited his staff—on loan from the CIA, FBI, DoD and other agencies—as a major 
contributing factor to this success.117 These analysts work side by side “trying to ensure 
that that information is crossing those traditional boundaries.”118 Chairman of the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Mike Rogers, remarked that the staff from 
the 16 different organizations that participate and serve NCTC, make this particular fusion 
center “integrated,” provide the expertise and resources to conduct its mission, and “[m]ost 
importantly, it [NCTC] has the buy-in from the rest of the community.”119 These 
improvements have been achieved through particular mechanisms that have initiated these 
changes and demonstrate the added benefit that NCTC contributes to the IC community as 
a whole. 
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a. SLT Community 
NCTC’s relationship with the SLT community bridges some of the gaps that the IC 
exhibited in 2001. State and local fusion centers, in partnership with DHS, need a way to 
both transmit and receive intelligence that they have either uncovered or need to be aware 
of. These fusion centers work directly and sometimes jointly with law enforcement 
personnel on the ground who discover individual fragments of information that without 
any context or other relevant associated information, might seem trivial or unimportant. 
Chairman Mike Rogers credited NCTC, along with DHS, as the two primary federal 
authorities interacting with the SLT on a consistent basis.120  
NCTC has fostered this relationship by directly bringing in local officials to work 
at the NCTC and interact with the other staff face to face. NCTC Director Michael Leiter 
reported in 2009: 
I am the proud, quote, unquote, “owner” of more than 10 state and state and 
local, tribal, officials from across the United States ... I have police officers 
from Clark County, Las Vegas; I have a firefighter from Seattle, New Jersey 
State Police, Boston Police Department ... [all whom] live in this sea of 
federal classified information and get that information back down, with the 
assistance of FBI and DHS, to state and local partners so they can do their 
part.121  
NCTC partners with DHS, the FBI, and the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team 
(JCAT) to host Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshops to aid federal, state, and 
local partners in identifying gaps in capabilities, resources, and training that need 
addressed.122 From Director Leiter’s perspective “we have to think globally about this 
challenge and act locally.”123 And it is these critical relationships that can help prevent 
terrorist attacks by allowing the transmission of a broad scope of information that can prove 
so crucial in being able to “connect the dots.” 
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b. Federal Partnerships 
NCTC has also worked to improve the relationship with other agencies at the 
federal level to affect a “whole of government” approach to CT efforts across the board. A 
Production Planning Board (PPB) meets on a daily basis to both synchronize and plan 
analytical efforts across the IC community to include analysts from the CIA, FBI, DHS, 
DIA, NSA, and NGA to ensure that resources are distributed correctly.124 NCTC also hosts 
the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT), which partners with “more 
than 100 members, meets monthly at NCTC, and actively coordinates critical 
counterterrorism issues such as emerging threats and threat countermeasures.”125 The 
NCTC Operations Center partners directly with the FBI Counterterrorism Division and 
both are collocated.126 The NCTC holds three video teleconferences per day, 365 days a 
year with 19 different organizations within the U.S. Government to ensure that everyone 
remains on the same page and that nothing critical falls through the cracks.127 NCTC has 
initiated and created Pursuit Groups “to develop tactical leads and pursue terrorism 
threats.”128 These Pursuit Groups provide specialized analysts who can track down 
actionable leads and partner with “the FBI, CIA, or DHS for intelligence purposes or 
action.”129 NCTC has taken multiple, tangible, and qualitative reform approaches to help 
assist in improving and coordinating partnerships with other external agencies. While 
perhaps a perfect, symbiotic relationship may still be out of reach with some of these 
organizations, still NCTC has demonstrated its worth to other agencies within the 
government and has mandated that other agencies both should and need to “buy-in” to what 
NCTC provides to the IC.  
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President Bush’s adoption of EO 13354 and Congress’ implementation of IRTPA 
into law established NCTC in its current form to help play a central role in bridging gaps 
the 9/11 Commission Report uncovered within the IC as a whole. The establishment of 
NCTC, however, did not occur without competitor opposition. NCTC’s mission boldly 
proposed removing traditional organizational boundaries, while adding yet another 
budgetary line that required new additional funding to stand up this new fusion center.  
From its establishment in 2004, NCTC has confronted the three primary challenges 
fusion centers face that inhibit the sharing of intelligence: the absence of a standardized 
model, an insufficient concentration on CT as a mission, and underdeveloped or missing 
external agency partnerships. With regards to the absence of a standardized model, because 
of its place atop the fusion center food chain, and with little to no precedence of a national 
counterterrorism fusion center, NCTC has had to strive to become the model for other 
fusion centers to emulate. NCTC did not have any shoes to actually fill or directions already 
laminated on each desk with how to do it right. NCTC had to become the model to help 
standardize and facilitate the wide-spread standup of a fusion center network that occurred 
during the decade following 9/11.  
While NCTC has fared better than other fusion centers in dealing with the diffusion 
of its core mission or its focus on CT, and despite the CT mission being clearly stated and 
understood, missions do, however, rely on strategies, and the strategy of the GWOT 
changed in 2006. Even though NCTC had only one mission, it still had to be adaptable in 
how it could best work to accomplish that mission in lieu of the new guidance received. 
Because of changes in strategy for the GWOT, NCTC has still faced challenges with 
regards to its mission since NCTC’s inception in 2004.  
The greatest challenge for NCTC, however, has been in tackling the issue of 
underdeveloped or missing external agency partnerships. The chaos that ensued with 
regard to federal agencies jockeying for changing roles and responsibilities resulted in 
NCTC being caught up in the bureaucratic knife fight that inherently takes place when 
budgets, reputations, and cemented agency flow charts are at stake. The difficulties started 
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from the very beginning with in-fighting and competition occurring between the CIA and 
FBI, while simultaneously conducting a difficult search for loyal employees that could be 
entrusted with NCTC’s best interest.  
Generally speaking, NCTC exhibited all three of these challenges the most, early 
on in 2004 and the years that immediately followed. Col. Reinwald and Col. Putbrese’s 
early criticisms deserved merit when they concluded NCTC to be lacking in process and 
procedures. Yet, since approximately 2009, NCTC has been recognized as a key player in 
the CT fight. It has demonstrated growing pains, no doubt, but perhaps one of the most 
important takeaways from NCTC to be reminded of is this fusion center did not just exist 
to compete for budget dollars and more personnel each year; rather, NCTC’s mission 
necessitates sharing information with key partners and ensures that different entities with 
a broad scope of responsibilities have access to the pertinent data and analysis they all 
require to focus on their mission(s). When a fusion center fails to share information, it slips 
quickly into the realm of wasteful government extras without a defining purpose or an 
instrumental role to play in national security. Luckily, NCTC has made monumental 
improvements to its structure, mission, and partnerships, which have allowed it to achieve 
purpose and be recognized as a critical node in the national CT effort.  
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III. THE EL PASO INTELLIGENCE CENTER  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Immediately following the events of 9/11, the U.S. Congress determined the 
security and integrity of the nation’s borders remained a “vitally important component of 
preventing future terrorist attacks.”130 Acts of terrorism carried out by either transnational 
or homegrown terrorists, who have traveled outside the country for training and planning, 
present themselves as a very real threat.131 Historically, many resources and efforts have 
been dedicated to achieve the ultimate objective of securing the southwest border of the 
United States. One of these resources, the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), works to 
support “law enforcement through the timely analysis and dissemination of intelligence on 
threats to the nation and those organizations responsible for illegal activities within the 
Western Hemisphere, having a particular emphasis on Mexico and the southwest 
border.”132 Even as EPIC has been recognized as one of the nation’s premier intelligence 
centers, it still has succumbed to the pressures of the three challenges fusion centers 
currently face.  
EPIC serves as an important case study because it operated and functioned as a 
fusion center before 9/11, existing originally as a fusion center with a single mission: 
providing intelligence for the “war on drugs,” and taking on this role with little precedence 
or any model to emulate. Originally, the establishment of EPIC by the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) was an effort to leverage intelligence capabilities and pit them against the 
growing narcotics problem emanating from Mexico and Central America—evident by the 
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DOJ’s decision to place the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in charge.133 
However, EPIC broadened its scope to “all threats,” primarily in response to 9/11, as well 
as the subsequent creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to integrate and 
coordinate efforts to thwart foreign and domestic threats to the homeland.134 Instead of 
creating individual solutions for individual problems—such as drugs and terrorism—the 
federal government opted to solve these individual problems and others with broad 
solutions by utilizing EPIC as multi-tool to go after too many challenges simultaneously. 
The decision to diffuse its focus diluted EPIC’s previous effectiveness, and has instead left 
EPIC with an overly broad mission, the inability to solidify its structure and role(s), and 
weakened interagency partnerships.  
The remainder of this chapter will examine both the background of EPIC and the 
overall support and criticisms of EPIC written in literature thus far. Also, the challenges of 
the absence of a standardized model, the broadening of its original mission, and recently 
strained external agency partnerships will be analyzed. Finally, the chapter will conclude 
with a summary regarding EPIC and its current role in homeland security and discuss how 
the broadening of EPIC’s original mission has diffused its overall effectiveness.  
B. THE BACKGROUND OF EPIC 
The history of EPIC really begins parallel to the history and the creation of the 
DEA. In the early 1970s, the federal government realized and acknowledged that 
America’s fascination with drugs had become an epidemic.135 Both the legislative and 
executive branches took action to combat this new “war on drugs.” In 1970, Congress 
worked to pass legislation titled the Controlled Substances Act, and just three years later, 
in 1973, President Richard Nixon approved a plan that reorganized and combined the 
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement, 
and the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence into a new, singular, over-arching agency, 
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the Drug Enforcement Administration.136 The DEA’s mission was to function as a law 
enforcement agency and find, arrest, and prosecute major drug criminals. Because of its 
specific role, the DEA inherently tended to most utilize and value tactical and investigative 
intelligence, which became the bedrock of its intelligence initiative.137 This law 
enforcement agency culture led to two important outcomes that would influence EPIC’s 
future operational efforts: (1) the DEA established its first task force, the Unified 
Intelligence Division, made up of individuals from the New York State Police, New York 
City detectives, DEA intelligence analysts and DEA special agents, and (2) launched an 
automated catalog system of records named the National Narcotics Intelligence System.138 
As national security expert Damien Van Puyvelde writes, “Some of the defining features 
of law enforcement intelligence appear very clearly in this early history of DEA 
intelligence, including the importance given to support intelligence consumers at various 
levels of government, and the use of databases and task forces to support decisions at the 
tactical level.”139 Yet often once the foundation is laid for a bureaucratic agency, 
organizational traits can be difficult to modify or transform.  
In 1974, the DOJ released a report originating from the Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs titled, “A Secure Border: An Analysis of Issues Affecting the U.S. 
Department of Justice.”140 One of the primary recommendations of the report suggested 
establishing “a regional intelligence center to collect and disseminate information relating 
to drugs, illegal aliens, and weapons smuggling to support field enforcement agencies 
throughout the country.”141  
Acting on that recommendation the same year, the DOJ established the El Paso 
Intelligence Center. From its inception, EPIC originally was intended to “collect and 
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disseminate information relating to drug, alien, and weapon smuggling by representatives 
of the DEA, the then U.S. Customs Service, and U.S. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service.”142 EPIC has since grown its workforce to over 400 individuals representing 28 
federal, state, and local agencies to include four international liaison officers.143 It supports 
intelligence-driven operations from all 50 states with additional support to Guam, Puerto 
Rico, the Virgin Island and Washington, DC.144 It also operates under a memorandum of 
understanding with Canada, Australia, and the Netherlands.145 In 2009, EPIC reported that 
55 percent of its customers identified as state and local law enforcement, including sheriffs’ 
departments, 25 percent from within the DEA itself, and the remaining 20 percent from 
other federal agencies.146  
Key events such as 9/11 and the 2010 slayings at the U.S. Consulate in Ciudad 
Juarez—just across the border from El Paso—have enabled EPIC to remain relevant and 
have worked in its favor by garnering support from key members of the U.S. 
Government.147 America’s exponentially growing concern with terrorism helped drive the 
demand for an intelligence community that requires collaborative, joint information-
sharing capabilities along with analysis that can harness different pieces of information 
into actionable intelligence. National Defense specialist Richard Best notes that, “The 
revelations after September 11, 2001, that intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
separately had incomplete pieces of information prior to the attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon, but had been unable to assemble and properly analyze them, led 
to statutory and policy changes.”148 The concept of fusion centers similar to EPIC quickly 
became the buzz-word to help solve the conundrum of information-sharing across different 
agencies and platforms in a relative, timely manner. Homeland Security became everyone’s 
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mission, including the DEA, and EPIC, “according to one of its former deputy directors, 
was turned into an ‘all-threat center.”149 Far from a painless transition, however, existing 
for almost 30 years as a tactical, anti-drug intelligence center, this transformation left EPIC 
a steep cliff to climb. 
C. REVIEWS, CRITICISM, AND SUPPORT FOR EPIC 
The reviews of EPIC within scholarly literature can be divided into two primary 
categories: support and criticism. Of note, EPIC’s reviews include more praise overall than 
the other two case studies of this thesis. Intelligence expert Damien Van Puyvelde applauds 
EPIC for its ability to adapt in an ever-changing intelligence environment. He concludes 
that EPIC has proven itself to be a successful joint venture that has aided in CT efforts and 
demonstrated the unique ability to adapt and change as necessary to remain relevant.150 
He notes that EPIC received requests for its intelligence expertise following 9/11 and the 
2005 London subway bombings.151 Even after being repurposed with the overly broad 
“all-threat center” moniker, EPIC has contributed to the broader CT effort. Yet, Van 
Puyvelde proposes, “as long as EPIC belongs to the DEA, its efforts to counter terrorism 
are likely to remain secondary to its drug enforcement mission.”152 Despite this divergence 
in its mission requirements, EPIC has proven itself capable of change and adaptation “on 
its own initiative.”153 This capacity to transform itself from within remains a unique ability 
and has produced a two-fold effect—external agency buy-in and demand for its services—
which in turn, has aided in breaking down stovepipes.154  
Still, while this thesis does not disregard the positive reviews that EPIC has earned 
from Van Puyvelde and even the federal government, EPIC still struggles in sharing 
intelligence because of difficulties with mission focus and strained external agency 
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partnerships, particularly at the federal level outside the DEA.155 External agency 
partnerships become strained within EPIC, as Van Puyvelde notes, when disagreements 
regarding analytical reports occur as “senior officials typically stand for their respective 
agency’s interest, and disregard each other’s comments.”156 A review of EPIC by the 
Office of the Inspector General within the Department of Justice found that EPIC operated 
without an “approved, up-to-date strategic plan or effective performance metrics.”157 This 
review alludes to a lack of standardization within EPIC and its processes, and as long as 
EPIC remains DEA-owned, it will inevitably continue to struggle with the dichotomy of 
operating as a fusion center tasked by the DEA to perform counter-drug intelligence 
analysis, while partners particularly on the federal side, such as DHS or NCTC, desire more 
focus on CT.  
D. THE ABSENCE OF A STANDARDIZED MODEL 
Damien Van Puyvelde asserts, “The roots of modern fusion centers can be traced 
to the law enforcement community where fusion has long been used as a part of temporary 
task forces and more permanent intelligence centers.”158 Just as NCTC has had to become 
the model for fusion centers regarding CT intelligence sharing, EPIC has also dealt with 
the hurdle of establishing itself as its own model, rather than emulating another 
organization. This early history of fusion centers that EPIC nearly singularly occupies 
makes it a relevant case for study with regards to intelligence sharing. When the DEA 
established EPIC in 1974, the task at hand could be seen as “the first major attempt at a 
permanent interagency operation” designed to harness different access points for 
information and fuse that information in order to transform it through analysis into 
actionable intelligence for the new “war on drugs.”159 
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This new venture in federal counter-drug fusion centers started from an identified 
need to help coordinate federal and local resources via actionable intelligence, similar to 
how NCTC developed due to the absence of a national-level fusion center dedicated solely 
to CT. At the time, different efforts by disparate agencies “were all collecting raw 
intelligence on drugs, the smuggling of weapons and aliens along the Southwest border, 
but were not coordinating and analyzing trends in any systematic ways.”160 The DEA 
established EPIC with the intention of filling that gap, and as drug trafficking expanded in 
the 1980s and 1990s, so did EPIC and its workforce. With 100 employees in the 1980s, 
over 300 in the 1990s, and over 400 as of 2015, EPIC’s influential role as a regional fusion 
center has only grown and developed with time, but not, however, in an organized 
fashion.161  
EPIC, similarly to NCTC, had no organization to emulate, yet, it would be 
inaccurate to conclude that because EPIC led the way for other fusion centers to follow, 
that this in turn, crippled EPIC’s ability to perform its original mission of counter-drug 
intelligence. Nevertheless, the way in which EPIC began operations without a model to 
implement its fusion analysis program, certainly the lack of standardization can be credited 
with certain problems. These issues range from what Keith Cozine defines as a “blurring 
of the lines” for agency responsibilities, all the way to failing to establish certain authorities 
that EPIC lacks to impose its intelligence priorities on anyone outside its own 
organization.162 Even though EPIC has garnered success with regards to counter-drug 
intelligence in the past, as its mission expanded and the partnerships became more 
complex, the absence of a standardized plan and fusion center centralization subsequently 
created difficulties for EPIC, particularly after 9/11.  
E. COUNTERTERRORISM AS A MISSION 
The expansion of EPIC’s mission to “all threats” diluted the ability of EPIC to 
deliver specialized intelligence to specific customers who needed that pertinent 
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information, thereby weakening external partnerships that EPIC established in its 
previously successful years and reducing buy-in.163 When EPIC was first founded in 1974, 
the DEA owned the center, which provided guidance and oversight that would drive EPIC 
to focus specifically on its primary goal: the drug problem along the southwest border of 
the United States.164 Yet, after 9/11, the United States Government implemented a plan to 
help synchronize the flow of information to help connect nodes of information between 
law enforcement and the intelligence enterprise. The DEA and its intelligence 
capabilities—including EPIC—were not exempt.165  
Nevertheless, the United States Government had substantial, plausible reasons for 
the re-orientation of its intelligence capabilities. As Damien Van Puyvelde asserts, “It is 
important to note that the crime-terror nexus is not a theoretical construct created to attract 
more federal funding towards law enforcement agencies but a reality that ought to be 
considered seriously.”166 EPIC’s success in providing intelligence for terrorism-related 
cases has demonstrated its ability to be useful in these situations. After the expansion of its 
mission to “all-threats,” however, EPIC has struggled with a much broader mission, both 
from the diffusion of its core competency in counter-drug intelligence, but also from the 
sheer volume of information it now attempts to analyze. EPIC now incorporates a broad 
array of mission-sets to include not only drugs, but “weapons trafficking, terrorism, human 
trafficking, human smuggling, illegal migration, money laundering and bulk cash 
smuggling.”167 The expansion into these other core competencies has merit, but it is not 
without impact to the overall functionality of EPIC and its ability to complete its mission(s) 
as the DEA and United States Government see fit.  
The “all threats” mission set has also affected EPIC through the dilution of its most 
powerful capability: its ability to produce results. When first developing the concept for a 
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fusion center network, a DHS official credited EPIC’s past success in intelligence fusion 
as part of the “inspiration behind the multiplication of fusion centers in the early twenty-
first century.”168 The expansion of EPIC’s mission has tempered that success, however. 
As Robert Taylor and Amanda Russell point out, “No place is the line more blurred than 
in fusion centers. … The problem is even more acute in some fusion centers, such as the 
one in El Paso, Texas where legitimate national interests and border security converge with 
organized crime cartels and sophisticated drug trafficking families.”169 The intention of 
fusion centers endeavored to bring different agencies together to collaborate and share 
information that can help piece together a more comprehensive picture than could hope to 
be achieved by an individual analyst or even an agency. There is a balance to be maintained, 
however. Fusion centers cannot hope to fuse “everything about everything” during the 
course of their analysis and processes. A more scoped mission set allows for focus and the 
development of real, tangible results, rather than a wide array of particularly un-relatable 
priorities. EPIC’s original mission was drugs. Now it has necessarily expanded that 
mission, but perhaps beyond what makes the most sense, particularly with its adoption of 
the “all threats” moniker.  
A wider mission set does not translate into more fusion, and therefore, more 
success. Fusion centers need to incorporate counterterrorism as a focus in their analysis in 
a post-9/11 world. EPIC is unique, however, in its historical roots, as well as in its 
reputation to produce results that aide in reducing the effects of crime in the southwestern 
region of the United States. Its needs to be granted the latitude to scale down certain areas 
of interest so it can return to the level of success it has enjoyed and been commended for 
in the past. Focusing on three or more particular intelligence-driven focus areas would help 
rebrand and refocus EPIC as an agency capable of accomplishing its specific mission and 
enable its analysts to produce the results they have been able to accomplish in the past.  
                                                 
168 Van Puyvelde, “Fusing Drug Enforcement,” 890. 
169 Taylor and Russell, “The Failure of Police ‘Fusion’ Centers,” 191.  
 
 46 
F. UNDERDEVELOPED OR MISSING EXTERNAL AGENCY 
PARTNERSHIPS 
Partially due to the overly broad mission that it has been forced to incorporate, 
EPIC has recently struggled with its ability to leverage and convince other agencies to 
relinquish portions of their staff to collaborate at EPIC. In February 2017, DOJ’s Office of 
the Inspector General (OIG) released a Follow-up Review of a 2010 study it conducted of 
EPIC. In the report, the OIG revealed two key findings. First, both managers and customers 
of EPIC revealed that its strength remains in its ability to access a broad scope of 
information from numerous agencies, yet, the report cited that it believed EPIC could not 
forcefully leverage all of its intelligence resources because of staff reductions and 
inexperienced analysts.170 Second, since 2014, EPIC’s leadership teams have not met 
frequently and have allowed the center to operate more autonomously than desired. The 
OIG concluded, “Partner agency leaders have not clearly determined the extent to which 
EPIC provides value to their agencies or how EPIC supports their agencies’ missions.”171 
The report detailed that outside agencies reduced the number of on-loan staff they sponsor 
by 45 percent since September 2013 due to “doubt about EPIC’s value” to their own 
respective home agencies.  
A Government Accounting Office (GAO) report concluded that EPIC in the past 
has not been “fully supported by participating agencies,” and this lack of cooperation had 
negatively impacted multiple projects.172 Yet, intelligence expert Damien Van Puyvelde 
asserts that interagency coordination “is the most important governance challenge faced by 
EPIC because it directly impacts the Center’s ability to fuse multiple agencies’ resources 
and capabilities to serve its customers.”173 Even as the importance of multi-agency 
cooperation must be understood in the context of an organization such as EPIC, so must 
the complexity and difficulty of achieving that level of cooperation.  
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The lack of investment by outside agencies into EPIC can be explained, however. 
In her book, Spying Blind, author Amy Zegart helps readers understand the landmark 
failures of the IC by examining events that occurred prior to 9/11 through the lens of 
organizational bureaucracy. Her perspective is that the “role of individuals in September 
11 has been grossly overstated, while the organizational causes of failure have gone largely 
unexamined.”174 She concludes that career incentives, agency loyalties, rational self-
interest, and the nature of bureaucratic organizations all cause intelligence agencies to 
inherently resist change and investment in organizations other than themselves.175 
Similarly, Damien Van Puyvelde summarizes: 
Coordination issues are common in the U.S. Security apparatus, particularly 
in multi-agency centers where the law enforcement, intelligence and 
military communities interact on a daily basis. Differences in organizational 
culture, procedures, objectives, resources and logistics all complicate the 
coordination of various agencies’ efforts, even when the latter share similar 
missions.176  
Amanda Russell and Robert Taylor argue that beneficial agency cooperation and 
fusion of information can be difficult to achieve, particularly for law enforcement agencies 
“possess a number of traits (e.g., autonomy and interagency ego) that hinder the effective 
and efficient sharing of information and intelligence.”177 All these authors seem to agree 
that if EPIC hopes to reap the benefits of multi-agency cooperation and team-building, it 
will need to find workarounds and incentives to help remove the roadblocks inherent to the 
particular structure and nature of joint-fusion intelligence centers.  
For all its worth and merit, EPIC is a DEA intelligence center. Its mission statement 
covers a broad range of threats, but at its heart it still remains a “drug intelligence 
center.”178 If it is going to actively pursue some of the best intelligence analysts that partner 
agencies can offer, then EPIC will need to demonstrate how it can work with those agencies 
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to expand their data set and foster, operate, and promote itself as a multi-agency 
intelligence center. One thing is for certain, if left to their own devices, each organization 
will indelibly look after its own self-interests before considering EPIC’s needs or mission 
success, making EPIC’s ability to demonstrate relevance and competency that much more 
important.  
G. SUMMARY 
The sharing of appropriate intelligence and information to other agencies in a 
timely manner is the primary purpose of fusion centers such as EPIC. President Obama’s 
National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding concludes that, “Our national 
security depends on our ability to share the right information, with the right people, at the 
right time.”179 Fusion centers such as EPIC offer the intelligence community this 
opportunity.  
EPIC has grown and evolved since its creation in 1974 and become the model that 
many other fusion centers have attempted to emulate. It will need to grow and evolve again, 
however, to meet the unique challenges that today’s broad homeland security mandate 
requires of it. Large quantities of information generated each day regarding national and 
homeland security and both external and internal threats play a critical role in border 
security. EPIC’s current mission statement proposes that it will broadly focus “on ‘all 
threats’ to include illegal drugs, weapons trafficking, terrorism, human trafficking, human 
smuggling, illegal migration, money laundering and bulk cash smuggling” with a 
concentrated focus on the southwest Border.180 Yet, to accomplish this mission, EPIC will 
need a vibrant, reciprocal relationship with other law enforcement agencies external to the 
DEA, but within the broader intelligence community.  
Every organization struggles with evolving, maintaining relevancy, mission-creep, 
and becoming the “jack of all trades.” But EPIC seems to have become organizationally 
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diluted to some degree, and it appears that primarily the DEA analysts who work at EPIC 
have become less focused after being asked to gather intelligence regarding other threats 
than drugs for which they are not as proficient at or recognized for. There is a cost vs. 
benefit analysis to be considered here, and perhaps that has already been completed. It is 
worth considering, however, that the fusion center that has been hailed as a model for other 
nascent fusion centers to imitate, previously benefited from a specific, focused mission that 
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IV. STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The ability to share intelligence underlies everything that state and local fusion 
centers hope to accomplish with regards to homeland security. State and local fusion 
centers occupy a unique position in relation to the IC. They operate and work with 
information and intelligence at a much more grass roots level than national or regional 
intelligence centers, yet, state and local fusion centers oftentimes have the best access to 
tactical intelligence that can be crucial in the prevention terrorist plots and surprise attacks.  
The 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing labeled state, local, and tribal 
entities as a “full and trusted partner with the Federal Government in our Nation’s efforts 
to combat terrorism, and therefore must be a part of an information sharing framework that 
supports an effective and efficient two-way flow of information enabling officials at all 
levels of government to counter and respond to threats.”181 Federal leadership wanted 
intelligence sources who could wrangle local resources and pull information from local 
law enforcement; the fusion center concept seemed the perfect mechanism to facilitate and 
stream those local sources of intelligence into a more comprehensive, albeit “fused” 
intelligence picture at the national level.  
The 9/11 Commission Report advocated for the implementation of state and local 
fusion centers to aid the IC in developing a more robust capability for preventing future 
terrorist attacks. The concept of SLT fusion centers bases its operations on four primary 
assumptions:  
(1) Intelligence, and the intelligence process, plays a vital role in preventing 
terrorist attacks; (2) It is essential to fuse a broader range of data including 
non-traditional source data, to create a more comprehensive threat picture; 
(3) State, local, and tribal law enforcement and public sector agencies are 
in a unique position to make observations and collect information that may 
be central to the type of threat assessment referenced above; [and] (4) 
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Having fusion activities take place at the sub-federal level can benefit state 
and local communities, and possible have national benefits as well.182  
These four assumptions, however, extend from another more basic assumption: 
individual fusion centers can and will share pertinent information at the right time to the 
correct people and agencies. To accomplish this task, an individual fusion center would 
need to have a standardized structure in place to both receive and share intelligence, 
understand what information is important and understand the priorities of their particular 
mission, and have bilateral relationships with other IC members and law enforcement 
agencies to ensure the right people are receiving critical intelligence.  
Case study three examines state and local fusion centers as a single entity. Similar 
to NCTC and EPIC in the previous two case studies, state and local fusion centers exhibit 
the three challenges evident with many fusion centers--the absence of a standardized 
model, the broadening of the original mission beyond CT, and external agency 
partnerships—and have experienced the most dynamic changes with regards to mission, 
standardization, and partnerships compared to the other two previous case studies. They 
have multiple officials overseeing them at the local, state, and federal levels, and have often 
been given conflicting guidance on what their role is and what their mission set includes, 
with much rarer guidance on what it excludes. State and local fusion centers require 
standardization and a focused mission set more than national and regional intelligence 
centers because of their position within the national IC framework. These more localized 
fusion centers exist at the bottom of the food chain and have to justify their necessity more 
than intelligence centers at the national and regional levels.  
While investigating a single fusion center would have added the benefit of 
identifying particular intricacies that either prevent or contribute to the three challenges 
that plague this level of fusion centers, analyzing the new concept of a National Network 
of Fusion Centers in this case study offers the opportunity to show how these challenges 
exist and affect the entire state and local network as a whole.  
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1. Differences in Opinion between State and Federal Leaders 
The unique position that state and local fusion centers occupy becomes conflated 
because state and local fusion centers exist as both a local and federal resource, making 
even something as simple as determining what intelligence should be analyzed and who it 
should be shared with contentious. At the federal level, homeland security and intelligence 
officials view the local fusion centers as “an indispensable part of their efforts to prevent 
terrorism because federal agents cannot monitor every potential target and can’t match 
locals’ knowledge of their home turf.”183 State officials, however, who primarily fund and 
maintain responsibility for their respective fusion centers, see these local intelligence 
centers as opportunities to focus “intelligence-led policing” efforts on local crime and 
regional hazards as “many fusion centers have established themselves as central 
clearinghouses for information sharing needs unique to their operation or local 
constituents.”184 The problem is only exacerbated by the limited understanding of 
differences between SLT and federal cultures with regards to “criminal justice and national 
security intelligence collection laws, policies, and fiscal constraints,” and what each can 
offer the other.185 This difference in perspective can put state officials vis-à-vis federal 
leadership and leave fusion centers to operate somewhere in the middle. Concerns about 
civil liberties and privacy only compound these difficult problems, which also plague both 
the overall concept and implementation of state and local fusion centers.  
The remedy for the different requirements from state, local and federal officials is 
widely seen as combining these individual fusion centers into a single network. How well 
the network operates, functions, shares information, and protects civil liberties ultimately 
determines its capability and value, not a single fusion center’s merit or capacity, 
particularly from the federal viewpoint. Prior to being considered a network, individual 
fusion centers struggled substantially with the three challenges posed by this thesis—much 
more so than either NCTC or EPIC from the previous case studies. Yet, with some robust 
                                                 
183 Shane Harris, “Fusion Centers Raise a Fuss,” National Journal 39 no. 6, (Feb 10, 2007), 50.  
184 Sam McGhee, “Impacting the Evolution of Information Sharing in the Post-9/11 United States,” 
The Police Chief, (February 2015,) 29.  
185 Ibid., 27. 
 
 54 
policy guidelines, strategies, and measurable goals with regards to capabilities set forth, 
state and local fusion centers have evolved, and the overall concept has developed into a 
National Network that allows for greater flexibility and individual tailoring to meet local 
needs, while still allowing for contributions to federal priorities.  
The remainder of this chapter will follow the same outline as the previous two case 
studies: a background, a review of support and criticism, analysis of each of the three 
primary challenges to fusion centers, and a short summary.  
B. THE BACKGROUND OF FUSION CENTERS 
1. The Founding History 
The 9/11 Commission Report mandated that “information be shared horizontally, 
across new networks that transcend individual agencies.”186 From these words the concept 
of fusion centers was born. From the federal government, the 2003 National Criminal 
Intelligence Sharing Plan outlined how to implement this concept and improve the flow of 
criminal intelligence across the nation. The following year in 2004, Congress enacted the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). This legislation mandated the 
creation of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) that could facilitate “the means for 
sharing terrorism information among all appropriate Federal, State, local, and tribal 
entities, and the private sector through the use of policy guidelines and technologies.”187 
These documents and policy recommendations did not outline the process or the mandate 
for individual local fusion centers; rather, they laid the foundation for a National Network 
that could relay and process large quantities of information and transform it into 
intelligence.  
Fusion centers were implemented in two distinct waves: the first occurring in 2003 
after the NCISP was published, and the second in 2005, after a National Governor’s 
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Association meeting where it was recognized that fusion centers could “enhance states’ 
ability to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence [and] intelligence sharing among 
federal, state, and local government.”188 In the years immediately following 9/11, state 
governments felt immense pressure to bolster homeland security efforts respective to their 
states, to follow the national trend in developing intelligence centers, to take advantage of 
a wave of federal funding being offered, all while viewing fusion centers as a convenient 
tool to further an “all-hazards” approach to a state’s capacity to either prevent or respond 
to different categories of potential catastrophes.189 Even early in their development, the 
federal and state perspective of fusion centers diverged from one another: the federal 
government identified fusion centers as a major terrorism prevention tool, while states 
oriented their perspective of fusion centers as more a means to respond to crime and natural 
disasters that affected only their individual state. Still, either from a federal or state 
viewpoint, the key to success of a fusion center remained in its overall ability to share 
information.190  
2. The Information Sharing Environment (ISE) 
One major attempt made to rectify sharing problems that fusion centers continually 
face was the creation of the ISE. The ISE houses the federal government’s framework for 
building the National Network. The ISE works as “a mechanism by which multiple levels 
of government and the private sector are supposed to communicate about terrorist 
threats.”191 The ISE works toward developing the capacity to horizontally share 
information between different federal agencies, while building the capability to move 
information vertically “between all stakeholders across all levels of government is the ISE 
goal,” a problem that particularly plagues local fusion centers that operate at the bottom of 
the IC framework.192  
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The Program Manager for the ISE works within the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, which has issued guidelines for the protection of civil liberties and 
personal privacy that have become a pervasive problem for fusion centers, especially at the 
local level.193 These guidelines set forth that organizations or agencies operating within 
the ISE—including fusion centers—must “comply with the Constitution and all applicable 
laws and executive orders relating to protected information.”194 Abiding within these laws 
and protecting privacy are complex issues, however.  
Each state has different regulations and instructions that apply for writing criminal 
or terrorism reports: “You’ve got 50 different sets of privacy laws. Can the police chief of 
San Diego share [reports] with the police chief of Atlanta? It depends upon the law in San 
Diego and the law in Georgia,” stated the program manager for the ISE, Thomas 
McNamara.195 These different kinds of laws—even with the implementation of the ISE—
can inhibit state and local fusion centers from sharing intelligence outside of their 
jurisdiction or state, and block the original intent and key purpose of fusion centers: 
intelligence sharing.  
3. Priorities and Functions of State and Local Fusion Centers 
State and local fusion centers benefit the federal government when federal agencies 
tap into the law enforcement and emergency management manpower on the ground, 
working in the thousands of communities across the country that might be privy to 
information that could build a more comprehensive intelligence picture at the national 
level. These centers also provide a direct avenue from which to approach and communicate 
with those communities and push information, bulletins, or warnings to local law 
enforcement or emergency management. Primarily though, the federal IC seeks tactical 
intelligence from these fusion centers because of the unique position they occupy at the 
grass-roots level.  
                                                 





At the state and local levels, however, the function of these intelligence operations 
differs somewhat and are not limited to the desire to push or pull CT intelligence both to 
and from the federal level. As Dr. James Steiner outlines in his article, “Needed: State-
level, Integrated Intelligence Enterprises,” state-level intelligence operates within three 
primary functions: “providing CT intelligence support to law enforcement; ensuring 
situational awareness for state-level executive and legislative decision makers; and 
providing critical infrastructure threat analyses to executive decision makers and policy 
implementation staff.”196 Not only are state leaders interested in terrorism-related cases or 
information, but they expect information about broader issues affecting their state. A local 
police chief, mayor, or even a state governor more likely concerns themselves more with 
local crime waves or even natural disasters than terrorism.  
Intelligence priorities that directly translate into the functions of fusion centers have 
fluctuated since the beginning of fusion center operations, primarily because of fluctuating 
fiscal resources. DHS initially provided over $300 million for initial fusion center 
development. In 2007, DHS Secretary Chertoff clarified, however, that these funds were 
intended only to help 
fledgling centers get off the ground and start to build fundamental baseline 
capabilities. This is not meant, by the way, to be sustainment funding. We 
are not signing up to fund fusion centers in perpetuity. But we do want to 
use these grants to target resources to help fusion centers make the capital 
investment and training investment to come to maturity. And then, of 
course, we expect every community to continue to invest in sustaining these 
very important law enforcement tools.197 
In the same year as Secretary Chertoff made this comment, however, Congress 
legislated a new funding bill that would increase financial support to fusion centers across 
the country.198 Congress hoped to attach to this money some federal priorities and control. 
“What we want to do ... is bring some order to what could be potential chaos,” stated one 
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Democratic staff member.199 Still, almost half of fusion center funding comes from the 
states themselves.200 Inconsistent funding becomes a real problem at a strategic level. Mike 
Sena, Director of the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center and President of the 
National Fusion Center Association stated, “It’s hard to run an operation like this when 
you don’t know what your budget will be. There’s no real funding strategy across the 
board.”201  
States now share much more of the fiscal responsibility for local fusion centers than 
they did when they were first implemented. Just from a funding perspective, it is easy to 
discern how fusion centers find themselves oftentimes hanging in the balance between 
federal and state priorities, and without clear-cut priorities or directives to follow.  
C. REVIEWS, CRITICISM, AND SUPPORT FOR FUSION CENTERS 
State and local fusion centers have, in large part, received far more criticism than 
the other two previous case studies that reviewed NCTC and EPIC. Whereas most 
criticisms of NCTC and EPIC focused on a key aspect or demanded a particular 
improvement, criticisms of state and local fusion centers often tend to ask more substantive 
questions regarding whether they can offer any real value or even potentially fulfill their 
mission? While criticisms of NCTC and EPIC often focus on ways to improve their 
functionality, state and local fusion centers often become scrutinized to a level that 
eventually questions whether their existence is even valid or continues to be relevant.  
Some of the largest and most consistent complaints come from groups and 
individuals concerned about three different broad issues: (1) the protection of civil liberties 
and privacy, (2) resource allocation, and (3) little or no value added in the effort to prevent 
terrorism or use intelligence effectively to thwart threats to public safety.  
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Author Anthony Newkirk views state and local fusion centers as “byproducts of the 
privatization of state surveillance and means of assault on civil liberties.”202 Newkirk 
criticizes fusion centers for their lack of transparency and asserts that the public as well as 
homeland security scholars really know very little about their operations that remain 
shrouded in secrecy.203 Author Torin Monahan denotes that no one is safe from the prying 
techniques of these intelligence gathering operations: “It is important to note that the 
politics of those being targeted by fusion centers spans the spectrum from right-wing militia 
member to left-wing anti-war activists.”204 Tim Sparapani, legal counsel for the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), remarked that, “We’re setting up essentially a domestic 
intelligence agency, and we’re doing it without having a full debate about the risks to 
privacy and civil liberties.”205 Even DHS oversight does not seem to help assuage the fears 
of many concerned individuals. When discussing former CIA Assistant Director Charles 
Allen, who was appointed to oversee the implementation of this nation-wide fusion center 
concept, Sparapani commented, “We’re concerned that Charlie Allen, and his successors, 
could become the next J. Edgar Hoover.”206 
Criticisms regarding fusion centers also include concerns about wasted resources. 
Oklahoma Senator Tom Coburn once stated, “Instead of strengthening our 
counterterrorism efforts, they [fusion centers] have too often wasted money and stepped 
on Americans’ civil liberties.”207 A U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations report detailed the findings of a two-year long investigation on fusion 
centers and discovered that they had been widely ineffective despite enormous amounts of 
public taxpayer funding spent to implement and develop their operations.208 DHS failed 
to monitor how grant funding had been spent by individual centers that totaled somewhere 
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between $289 million and $1.4 billion, with much of the money spent during a period of 
stagnant American economic performance.  
Finally, much criticism about fusion centers has centered on their inability to 
function and produce quality products and or measurable results. A Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) report prepared for Congress recounted a truly critical conclusion 
regarding these state and local fusion centers: 
It is unclear if a single fusion center has successfully adopted a truly 
proactive prevention approach to information analysis and sharing. No state 
and its local jurisdiction appear to have fully adopted the intelligence cycle. 
While some states have seen limited success in integrating federal 
intelligence community analysis into their fusion centers, research indicates 
most continue to struggle with developing a “true fusion process” which 
includes value added analysis of broad streams of intelligence, 
identification of gaps, and fulfillment of those gaps, to prevent criminal and 
terrorist acts.209  
Others have cited fusion centers for poor partnerships with other outside agencies and that 
the level of terrorist activity in most areas do not warrant the huge investment a fusion 
center requires.210 Torin Monahan views fusion centers as suffering from a “mandate that 
is too open-ended and from guidelines that are too ambiguous.”211 Yet, even if these 
problems or hurdles could be minimized, fusion centers would still suffer from their central 
challenge: balancing national interests in the prevention of terrorism while providing 
information that remains relevant to local law enforcement and state jurisdiction.212 
Even with the substantial and prevalent criticism that has plagued fusion centers 
almost from their inception, still supporters do exist and believe that the fusion center 
concept warrants merit and can address the huge gap in intelligence capability identified 
by the 9/11 Commission Report. Chief Intelligence Officer at DHS, Charles Allen, stated, 
“Our ability to move, analyze, and act on information is our greatest strength. And, we 
must use the (national fusion center) information in that network to push our defensive 
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perimeter outward.”213 John Rollins’ CRS report noted, “From a law enforcement 
perspective, it has been argued that state and regional intelligence fusion centers, 
particularly when networked together nationally, represent a proactive tool to be used to 
fight a global jihadist adversary which has both centralized and decentralized elements.”214 
Supporters believe the fusion process provides one of the best opportunities to produce 
actionable knowledge.215 Former Connecticut Senator Joe Lieberman has argued that “the 
public record showed that fusion centers had played a significant role in thwarting terrorism 
and had generated hundreds of leads for the FBI.”216 Success stories do indeed exist such 
as in 2009, the North Carolina Information Sharing & Analysis Center provided 
intelligence to law enforcement that led to the disruption of a terrorist group led by an 
American named Daniel Patrick Boyd who had facilitated money and transportation to 
terrorists operating overseas.217 Despite robust criticisms and even some concerning 
failures in the past, in 2013, the United States House of Representatives Committee on 
Homeland Security concluded, “The National Network [of fusion centers] is on a path of 
continued growth, improvement, and increasing value to both the Federal Government and 
the fusion centers’ individual customers.”218 This National Network seems to be the key 
aspect of the fusion center concept that can best allow fusion centers to contribute to the 
national intelligence picture while still remaining relevant their local communities and state 
leadership. Linking these fusion centers under a broader mantle with national oversight 
while allowing for individual tailoring to meet state and local needs offers greater 
flexibility for an individual fusion center to satisfy the requirements of both.  
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D. THE ABSENCE OF A STANDARDIZED MODEL 
State and local fusion centers suffer from a lack of standardization more than NCTC 
or EPIC because of the broader range of missions they have been assigned, a wider 
collection of partners, and a more diverse background from which these individual fusion 
centers emanated from. As John Rollins concluded in his CRS report, “Ultimately, without 
a common framework among disparate fusion centers and other homeland security 
agencies, it is possible that benefits of their efforts will remain narrow, rather than having 
a national impact.”219 The fusion center concept was implemented with no single model 
in mind, which would have provided the building blocks for standardization across the vast 
array of individual fusion centers.220 The cost of failing to incorporate standards or 
developing a model for the new fusion centers has yielded many of the criticisms leveled 
at their efforts thus far. A lack of standardization has made it more difficult to assess results, 
allowed for fusion centers to operate without a clear directive, left particular gaps in 
capabilities, and made an ill-defined purpose not only more probable, but likely. Without 
a clear-cut mission, measurable objectives, and a means with which to measure 
performance, success as an organization remains all but impossible.  
1. The Lack of Standardization as a Benefit 
Other writers offer the opposing argument that a lack of standardization acts as a 
benefit. Dr. James Steiner concludes, “State requirements vary significantly across the 
country, and a single model will not meet every state’s needs.” David Carter and Jeremy 
Carter argue that the lack of a uniform model “permits state and local agencies to mold the 
fusion center into a model that best suits the needs and challenges that are idiosyncratic to 
each jurisdiction.”221 The Constitution Project think-tank’s “Recommendations for Fusion 
Centers,” concluded that the “decentralized nature of fusion centers is a source of strength, 
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because each fusion center has the institutional knowledge and flexibility necessary to 
adapt and respond to the unique demands of its jurisdiction.”222  
State and local fusion centers, undoubtedly, need to fulfill the unique needs that 
their independent jurisdictions require of them. They need to have the flexibility to pursue 
the different avenues that the information they receive leads them to investigate in order to 
transform that information into actionable intelligence. Nevertheless, the end result of 
merely satisfying local requirements will not be enough to make any individual fusion 
center successful due simply to the large amounts of federal funding that these intelligence 
operations have received since their inception and have continued to acquire on a yearly 
basis. Congress and important federal agencies like the FBI will continue to inquire about 
their contributions to CT and benefits to federal law enforcement and intelligence 
initiatives. Fusion centers will need to strike a balance between these state and federal 
expectations if they are going to continue to receive millions of dollars in funding from 
both parties.  
Not a single model, but a National Network with 79 different nodes needs to be the 
concept that not only DHS and other advocates of fusion centers have adopted, but the 
single network concept needs to be embraced by individual fusion center leadership and 
intelligence analysts. The need to either please state and local government leadership or to 
focus singularly on CT in order to provide some benefit to federal agencies can be 
overcome by actively sharing intelligence across the National Network, which in turn 
offers the best compromise for individual fusion centers. More importantly, the gaps that 
the 9/11 report identified in the inability of the IC to share information across different 
domains and levels of government will undoubtedly be “fused” back together, while 
fulfilling the original purpose of the fusion center concept.  
E. COUNTERTERRORISM AS A MISSION 
When considering the function and mission of state and local fusion centers, it 
important to remember that fusion centers “were originally intended to focus on terrorist 
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threats.”223 CT needs to be incorporated into the mission statement of every single fusion 
center in order to balance both state and federal needs, demonstrate buy-in and intent to 
contribute to the National Network framework, and provide consistency across so many 
individual fusion centers operating across the country. The national-level Homeland 
Security Advisory Council (HSAC) theorized that, “one of the principal outcomes should 
be the identification of terrorism-related leads.”224 Believers in the value of a National 
Network “argue that the 800,000 plus law enforcement officers across the country know 
their communities most intimately and, therefore, are best placed to function as the ‘eyes 
and ears’ of an extended national security community.”225 Only by incorporating the 
information gathered at the ground-level can those working at the national level hope to 
piece together a comprehensive intelligence picture, making the tactical intelligence that 
state and local fusion centers often have access to first, a national requirement.  
1. An Expanded Mission 
Fusion center mission statements have expanded in recent years, however, away 
from their original CT roots. The Constitution Project summarized that while “fusion 
centers are intended to be a cornerstone of domestic anti-terrorism efforts their goals and 
efficacy are not always clear. Without a clearly defined purpose, fusion centers may suffer 
from ‘mission drift.”226 In reality, this “drift” has resulted in various fusion centers’ 
mission focus becoming wider in order to incorporate an “all-threats” or “all-hazards” 
model.227  
A CRS report outlined three reasons for this change. First, fusion center leadership 
felt pressured to incorporate “all-threats” or “all-hazards” into their mission statements 
because of a real, observed change occurring across the country.228 Second, most fusion 
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centers felt “it was impossible to create ‘buy-in’ amongst local law enforcement agencies 
and other public sectors if a fusion center was solely focused on counterterrorism.”229 This 
issue has only expanded in prevalence as most fusion centers predominantly see law 
enforcement personnel as the major source of their participation and staff.230 Finally, 
fusion centers have reported that broadening their mission statement has made it easier to 
apply for a larger array of funding, while attracting resources from a broader range of 
agencies and partners.231 Expanding a fusion center’s mission focus because of these 
reasons is mostly based on attempts to demonstrate value to state and local partners and to 
secure funding from sources other than the federal government. While understandable, this 
approach risks the loss of federal support and funding. The fifteen centers that make no 
specific reference to CT in their adopted mission statements need to incorporate CT into 
their mission focus to reorient their operations, demonstrate buy-in to their partners across 
the National Network, and show how their fusion centers remain dedicated to building a 
national CT intelligence picture.232  
2. The Relationship between Crime and Terror 
Some homeland security experts have attempted to link crime with terror, thereby 
demonstrating that a focus on crime, in reality, translates to a focus on terrorism. This belief 
assisted in transforming fusion center focus to “embrace all crimes and all threats.”233 
Fusion center leadership “recognized that most terrorist acts had a nexus with other crimes; 
hence, by focusing exclusively on terrorism, they may miss some important indicators” 
and because most crime “was transjurisdictional and involved in complex criminality ... 
they recognized that the fusion process would be of value in dealing with these crimes.”234  
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The uptick of so many mass casualty events in recent years, has resulted in the line 
between terrorism and less politically motivated violence to indeed blur. A clear-cut 
definition of terrorism remains skewed and unclear, and the media’s rush to immediately 
classify almost every mass casualty tragedy as “terrorism” has assisted in this blurring. 
Yet, not including strategic intelligence, the differences between classic terrorism cases 
and cases of mass casualty violence remain trivial at the tactical level and unimportant to 
first responders, the world in which fusion centers primarily exist and operate.  
Lt. Sam McGhee of the Aurora, Colorado, Police Department—who helped develop 
the first national strategy for the National Network of Fusion Centers—summarized that, “It 
is understandable that law enforcement leaders struggle with the concern of focusing efforts 
between crime and terrorism, but as there is a growing relationship between the two, strong 
information sharing principles serve to avert both.”235 Examples of the “nexus” between 
crime and terrorism do indeed exist. A narcotics investigation “revealed a Canadian-based 
organization supplying precursor chemicals to Mexican methamphetamine producers was in 
fact a Hezbollah support cell.”236 Another case out of California involved a gas station 
robber who dropped his cell phone. After investigating the contents of the phone, police 
officers “uncovered a homegrown Jihadist cell planning a series of attacks.”237 Without a 
doubt, the possibility of discovering terrorists or their plans during a local criminal 
investigation remains possible, even probable, at some point. Perhaps, it is just a case of 
merely articulating and including CT into goals and mission statements that needs to occur. 
To be successful on all fronts, fusion centers will need to continue to pursue CT both actively 
with terrorism-related intelligence, as well as passively with criminal terrorism-related cases 
and supporting intelligence analysis.  
3. The Way Ahead 
The environment within which fusion centers operate remains complex with 
different competing priorities, and often includes opposing viewpoints regarding their 
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overall purpose and mission. With these complexities being their reality, it is important for 
state and local fusion centers to remain grounded and focused on the intelligence collection 
and analytic basics from which the often elusive “intelligence success” emanates. Fusion 
centers were implemented as “full and trusted partners with the Federal Government in our 
Nation’s efforts to combat terrorism, and therefore must be a part of an information sharing 
framework that supports an effective and efficient two-way flow of information enabling 
officials at all levels of government to counter and respond to threats.”238  
The purpose of state and local fusion centers has changed from assisting the IC in 
acquiring tactical CT intelligence to now bearing the overly broad “all-threats” or “all-
hazards” mantle. DHS has adopted this “all-hazards” approach to its mission, and 
consequently, so have fusion centers for which DHS serves as the central touchpoint for 
the federal government. This adoption has provided some benefits to include encouraging 
stronger ties to state leadership and local community law enforcement, providing a wider 
avenue of approach to obtain necessary funding. Yet, this change has created a condition 
that allows and even fosters “mission drift.” Fusion centers need to take serious the CT 
mission and understand that it alone preceded both the fusion center and the National 
Network concepts. Fifteen fusion centers with no mention of CT in their mission statement 
is fifteen too many.239 To be successful on all fronts, state and local fusion centers must 
act as a bridge between law enforcement and federal agencies at the national level: 
“Without the National Network, the sharing of criminal intelligence and information would 
revert back to silos and a system of disconnected structures. Sustaining fusion centers is 
critical to the nation’s homeland security efforts.”240  
F. UNDERDEVELOPED OR MISSING EXTERNAL AGENCY 
PARTNERSHIPS 
Functional partnerships remain particularly important for state and local fusion 
centers because they not only require buy-in from other agencies as do NCTC and EPIC, 
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but to serve as a bridge between local law enforcement and national-level intelligence 
agencies, state and local fusion centers need buy-in from local community partners, as well 
as partnerships with various federal organizations. A CRS report to Congress highlighted 
that “federal participation in state and regional fusion centers appears to influence the 
relationship between levels of government, state and local access to information and 
resources, the flow of information/intelligence, and maturation with regards to intelligence 
cycles.”241 One of the keys to success for state and local fusion centers is partnerships, not 
just to obtain more information to analyze, but to ensure that any pertinent information is 
delivered to the right people who can take the appropriate action upon its delivery.  
From the start, state and local fusion centers have struggled with building and 
maintaining partnerships with federal agencies. Many fusion centers have reported that 
creating an environment that fosters vertically sharing intelligence with these different 
agencies has been difficult: 
Numerous fusion centers officials claim that although their center receives 
a substantial amount of information from federal agencies, they never seem 
to get the “right information” or receive it in an efficient manner. According 
to many state fusion center leaders, often pertinent threat intelligence must 
be requested by fusion centers, rather than federal agencies being proactive 
in providing it. The obvious difficulty arises regarding the inability to 
request relevant threat information that is unknown to members of the 
fusion center.242  
Reports such as this one are troubling because the concept for these fusion centers and the 
National Network deemed these intelligence centers as the bridge between local law 
enforcement and federal agencies within the IC. Yet it seems at best, the National Network 
only functions as a one-way conduit. If fusion centers do not receive the right information 
from the bottom or the top, then their functionality fails through little fault of their own.  
Fusion centers are not the exception, however; tension between state and local 
entities and federal agencies has existed for decades. They both view their roles, 
responsibilities, and jurisdictions from different perspectives, and in some cases “residual 
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resentment” exists because of “years of being treated as inferior and an information 
source—not necessarily as a consumer.”243 The distrust goes both ways though as those 
who work for federal agencies such as the FBI often distrust SLT entities because of 
concerns “about the erosion of federal jurisdiction, and, in some cases, a resistance to 
accepting an enhanced SLT role in some homeland security areas.”244 More specifically, 
differences in “intelligence collection laws, policies, and fiscal constraints,” lead to 
misunderstanding both on the part of SLT and federal law enforcement and intelligence 
officials.245  
An example of where this kind of tension can lead would be the Boston Marathon 
bombing case and how in the immediate months that followed, Boston police officials 
publicly criticized the FBI field office for sending their police officers “on wild goose 
chases ... [and] giving them long lists of targets to protect without explaining why.”246 
Frustrated with the “one-sided nature of this information-sharing, state and local 
governments established fusion centers to do what the federal government often couldn’t—
provide their communities with concrete intelligence, drawn from known sources, about 
potential terrorists.”247 The frustration evident in this example highlights how the 
challenge with building partnerships vis-à-vis federal agencies can be so detrimental to 
fusion centers sharing information vertically to the federal level, as well as state and local 
entities.  
1. The Way Ahead 
How to improve and build functional relationships remains a complex task for state 
and local fusion centers. They operate in a gray area between state and local police 
departments and federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. To be their best, they 
need reciprocal, positive flows of information that can help build a more robust, complete 
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intelligence picture to thwart terrorist plots and other threats to homeland security. The best 
way for fusion centers to create buy-in from both local law enforcement and federal 
authorities is for fusion center leadership to devise ways that clearly demonstrate how their 
fusion center can directly benefit other partners. Richard Thorpe in his article “Images of 
Organization” concludes that real power within organizations is wielded by those who 
consistently demonstrate value and benefit other individuals within the organization, and 
that power is not reserved for mere rank and title alone.248 Similarly, fusion centers need 
to demonstrate this “value and benefit” as an entire organization to both their local and 
national partners. They need to gain and wield power by demonstrating to their vertical and 
horizontal partners that they can provide tactical CT intelligence to federal authorities, 
while also assisting local leadership with crime and disaster resiliency priorities, all of 
which makes meaningful contributions to the National Network.  
G. SUMMARY 
When comparing the three case studies covered in Chapters II, III and IV, state and 
local fusion centers have suffered the most criticism, undergone the greatest alteration to 
their mission, and been tasked to serve two widely separate entities: federal and state 
authorities. Without any standards or originating organization to model themselves after, 
no two fusion centers seem to be identical. This difference can be seen as both an obstacle 
to overcome or as an underlying benefit, nevertheless, the National Network concept 
allows for fusion centers to have flexibility while still achieving some much-needed 
standardization with the accompanying National Network guidelines and the operating 
principles housed within the ISE. 
The research for this thesis suggests that all state and local fusion centers need to 
incorporate CT intelligence priorities not only within their mission statements, but their 
daily operations. Their original purpose needs to be acknowledged by the very centers 
themselves. While there does seem to be some relationship between crime and terrorism, 
embracing an “all-threats” and “all-hazards” approach only makes sense if each center 
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really intends to analyze all the different threats that fall within these broad categories, 
including CT. Proper management and priorities need to be clearly articulated in lieu of 
such a wide mandate. This diffusion of mission does allow each fusion center greater 
flexibility in its ability to provide information to a greater number of customers and 
partners, and if properly managed, should assist the National Network in demonstrating a 
greater overall value to Congressional members and leadership of the IC. 
If fusion centers can provide usable, pertinent intelligence, then stronger 
partnerships at the state and federal level will emerge. If fusion centers want information 
to better flow from federal agencies, they will need to contribute to the mission of those 
federal authorities as a basis for fostering a stronger relationship. Each agency wants to 
accomplish its mission and demonstrate proficiency along the way. If fusion center 
leadership can find ways to help other agencies with their priorities, this will allow them 
to gain and maintain a more mutually beneficial partnership with these other agencies and 


















Following a direct recommendation from the 9/11 Commission Report, intelligence 
fusion centers were implemented through federal and state efforts to help close the gaps in 
intelligence sharing capability across the United States Government. However, in the years 
that followed, fusion centers have been heavily criticized and cited for failing to do just 
that—share intelligence. Fusion centers at the national, regional and state and local levels 
have all shared in this criticism; and, they all have shared three primary reasons for 
struggling to gather, analyze, and pass on critical intelligence.  
The primary purpose of this thesis was to show how each challenge affected fusion 
centers at various levels of government, albeit sometimes in unique ways. The case studies 
of NCTC, EPIC, and the National Network of state and local fusion centers demonstrate 
how all three challenges indeed inhibit fusion centers from sharing intelligence both 
vertically and horizontally to various levels of the IC and law enforcement community.  
A. NCTC 
1. The Lack of a Standardized Model 
NCTC received no model to emulate itself after upon its inception in 2004. It 
occupied a landscape of disparate intelligence organizations each occupying their own 
bureaucratic territory and generating their own intelligence, yet NCTC needed to overcome 
years of solidified bureaucratic resistance. Early on NCTC suffered from its own internal 
struggles and failed to truly function as a fusion center. To succeed, NCTC would need to 
become a model for other fusion centers to follow in the years to come. It is difficult to 
conclude from the currently available literature whether NCTC has been able to complete 
that task, but it does seem true that NCTC has taken strides to standardize its analysis and 
solidify as an organization. It demonstrates proficiency and functionality, which directly 
translates to greater information sharing and CT efforts.  
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2. Counterterrorism as a Mission 
NCTC has benefited from being allowed to retain its sole focus on CT as an 
intelligence center. Yet, the U.S. strategy for defeating terrorism changed in 2006, and 
subsequently NCTC’s mission needed to adapt as well. Early on, NCTC struggled with 
these changes, but in more recent years, it has revealed the benefits of focusing on the core 
tenet of CT, which can yield real, appreciable results.  
3. Underdeveloped or Missing External Agency Partnerships 
NCTC’s ability to build functional partnership has been hampered by legacy 
bureaucratic struggles between federal agencies fighting for recognition, budget resources, 
and capability enhancements. Also, NCTC struggled to find the right people to help build 
the right framework from which it could accomplish its central mission. NCTC needed 
enough credibility to be able to compel action from other entities outside its direct control, 
in lieu of the limited statutory powers it was granted by IRTPA. Interface with other 
external partners has increased overall by utilizing mechanisms such as JCAT, but of the 
three challenges, partnerships has been the greatest obstacle for NCTC to overcome in 
order to improve its ability to share information.  
B. EPIC 
1. The Lack of a Standardized Model 
EPIC needed an organization to model itself after, but EPIC, in its nascent phase, 
became one of the earliest recognized fusion centers in the American IC. It began as an 
intelligence operation designed to support the war on drugs and grew rapidly in the decades 
that followed its startup in 1974. The lack of standardization did not prevent EPIC from 
fulfilling its function as a counter-drug intelligence center, but without an organization to 
model itself after, EPIC was forced to blaze its own trail and create new practices, which 
resulted in blurred agency responsibilities and absent authorities that it needed to better 
orchestrate and share the critical intelligence it generated. 
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2. Counterterrorism as a Mission 
EPIC began as a regional intelligence center with the primary focus of counter-drug 
intelligence on the southwest border, and because of this very specific and special focus, 
EPIC yielded the kind of intelligence products and analysis that law enforcement and 
policy-makers desire. After 9/11, EPIC was reorganized to adopt the “all-threats” mission 
and the reviews of EPIC since then reveal how this overly broad mission set can be such a 
death-knell to a results-driven intelligence cycle. Fusion centers cannot hope to fuse 
“everything about everything.” More priorities do not directly yield more results, and 
regional fusion centers such as EPIC do not need to be given an ill-defined amount (i.e., a 
“sushi-menu”) of priorities. They need to be charged with only a few major focus areas 
from which they can build depth and expertise. This kind of in-depth focus in their 
collection and analysis, remains perhaps the only way to yield the kind of tactical 
intelligence prized at this level of operation. The transition to an “all-threats” mission and 
the expectation of EPIC to do more than focus on drug or related crime-terrorism nexus 
priorities has dampened its mission effectiveness. This expanded mission reprioritization 
remains the biggest challenge that EPIC currently faces.  
3. Underdeveloped or Missing External Agency Partnerships 
In recent years, partner agencies have exhibited a diminished interest in their 
personnel and investing their resources into EPIC. Part of this reduction can be explained 
by the fact that EPIC continues to be operated by the DEA, and because of bureaucratic 
self-interest, outside agencies might be hesitant to invest outside of themselves. Yet, this 
problem has a long history within the IC, and EPIC has always been located under the 
umbrella of the DEA. The other possible conclusion then, is that a second-order effect of 
broadening its mission beyond drug crimes and terrorism-related cases, has diluted EPIC’s 
effectiveness to a degree that other agencies cannot be sure as to what EPIC’s real purpose 
continues to be or how EPIC can benefit their own organization and its priorities.  
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C. STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS 
1. The Lack of a Standardized Model 
State and local fusion centers suffer from a lack of standardization more than NCTC 
or EPIC. These vastly different intelligence centers operate with different mandates, work 
for different police chiefs and governors across the country, and deal with disparate 
situations and backgrounds that vary from rural or urban to border or interior regions. These 
state and local fusion centers need the flexibility to fulfill their niche requirements, but 
without standardization, results are either difficult or impossible to assess, gaps in 
collection and analysis remain, and the shared intelligence mandate becomes particularly 
difficult to address. Ultimately, the harsh criticism that this level of intelligence fusion 
centers has received in the past will continue until standardization becomes a reality in their 
daily operations. The lack of standardization remains the single greatest challenge for state 
and local fusion centers because it impedes improving in the other two areas of challenge: 
mission and partnerships. Primarily, DHS has been tasked with providing oversight and 
guidance to the development of the National Network concept, but the task ought to lie 
with the DNI at the top of the IC pyramid. The DNI provides more legitimacy, has a 
Congressional mandate to provide this kind of intelligence oversight, and understands the 
unique nuances and concerns of the broader IC than DHS.  
2. Counterterrorism as a Mission 
State and local fusion centers were implemented in direct response to the 9/11 
terrorist attacks and derived their purpose from their CT roots. Many have reduced or 
eliminated their focus on CT, however, partly because DHS adopted the “all hazards” 
moniker, and state and local fusion centers followed suit. Yet, the original intent of fusion 
centers was to provide an exchange of ground-level tactical intelligence to inform federal 
responses to terrorist threats. The need for this type of information still exists and has been 
provided by state and local fusion centers such as the North Carolina Information Sharing 
& Analysis Center, which provided intelligence that directly contributed to the disruption 
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of a terrorist group led by an American named Daniel Patrick Boyd.249 The lack of CT 
focus by many of these fusion centers is concerning, partly because they are judged by 
federal overseers for their CT contributions or lack thereof; but more importantly, because 
the gaps that the 9/11 Commission Report detailed in the ability to collect and share 
information across the IC can still exist if “the right information, [is not shared] with the 
right people, at the right time.”250  
3. Underdeveloped or Missing External Agency Partnerships 
From the beginning, establishing reciprocal relationships with intelligence partners 
has proven a difficult task for state and local fusion centers, particularly at the federal level. 
Trust on both sides is difficult to build and maintain. The National Network concept needs 
to demonstrate its ability to benefit these federal organizations and contribute to their 
priorities. When given the opportunity, state and local fusion centers need to demonstrate 
competency and interest in building a mutually beneficial relationship with other members 
of the IC at the regional and national level. Improving in overall standardization and 
refining particular mission sets will be a necessary precursor to achieving this goal. Sharing 
critical, tactical level intelligence on a consistent basis will yield the kind of partnerships 
that can in turn, benefit the individual state and local fusion centers as well by building 
credibility through sustained performance.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendation #1: Even though DHS has transitioned to an “all-hazards” or “all-
threats” mission approach, neither regional nor state and local intelligence fusion centers 
should adopt this axiom, nor should they feel pressured to do so by DHS. What 
Congressional and federal level overseers look for from these smaller intelligence 
organizations remains rooted in the overall CT effort and local concerns particular to the 
specific situation each intelligence center occupies. If an intelligence center’s main premise 
exists because of a drug problem particular to that region, then the fusion center should be 
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allowed the flexibility to concern itself with that priority and to relay any terror-crime 
nexus intelligence to federal partners. CT and these specific threats should be what the 
mission statement includes, and most if not all other hazards or threats should be excluded 
from the mission statement. Fusion centers do need to manage their specific priorities and 
prevent “mission creep,” but it is unfair for DHS or even the DNI to ask a small 
organization to focus its limited collection and analysis capabilities on “everything” when 
it lacks the resources or the mandate from both federal and state leaders to do so.  
Recommendation #2: The most practical course of action that could be taken to 
strengthen the partnerships that fusion centers desperately need to build and maintain, 
would be to increase their investment in other organizations outside of themselves. 
Individual fusion centers at all levels of government need to understand their partners’ 
organizational mission focus and interests, while ensuring they share the critical 
intelligence that best benefits these agencies. Doing so will produce a two-fold effect. First, 
it will ensure that the intelligence community builds the best comprehensive picture it can 
by delivering pertinent information to the most relevant analysts. Second, and perhaps 
more importantly for individual fusion centers, it offers them the opportunity to 
demonstrate their utility to other organizations, which over time will strengthen their 
overall standing with these external agencies and organizations. 
Intelligence officials often complain that other players within the community refuse 
to works as team-players. But realistically, disparate intelligence organizations cannot exist 
as teammates. They often work for agencies that fulfill very different roles at different 
levels of government and naturally preoccupy themselves with different interests. What 
intelligence organizations need to work toward would be more akin to functioning as 
mutual “partners” where each individual fulfills their role to the best of their specific 
abilities, but understands their responsibility to cross-over to assist other parties when 
required, similar to something like mutual-aid pacts between emergency services that 
operate within jurisdictional boundaries, but provide capabilities and resources outside 
their specific areas of responsibility when required.  
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E. FINAL THOUGHTS 
Overall, intelligence fusion centers at every level of the IC could benefit from 
reorienting their emphasis toward perfecting the “blocking-and-tackling” of intelligence 
practice—the collection, analysis, and communication of critical intelligence. This thesis 
specifically shows how any fusion center void of standardization and/or an unclear, 
unfocused mission, essentially lends itself not only to criticism, but almost guarantees for 
itself weakened or one-sided partnerships with other organizations in the IC.  
In 1996, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) employee Russ Travers wrote an 
article titled, “A Blueprint For Survival: The Coming Intelligence Failure,” in which—as 
the title implies—he predicted a large-scale, near-future intelligence failure like the attack 
that occurred on September 11, 2001. The reason he predicted for the failure would simply 
be “we [the IC] have gotten away from the basics.”251 Travers cited “a lack of fusion and 
a lack of objectivity will be principally responsible for the IC failing the nation,” 
consequently contributing to the IC equaling “substantially less than the sum of its 
parts.”252 But the parts now exist and they remain in place at least for now to allow for this 
fusion process to occur. Fusion centers exist at every level of the IC and the capability to 
collect relevant intelligence at the national, regional, or state and local level remains 
possible.  
1. The Largest Hurdle 
Overcoming the challenge that standardization poses will be a complex task, 
particularly for state and local fusion centers, yet, it is vitally important to accomplish. This 
level of fusion centers is most at risk for the possible conclusion that any, most, or perhaps 
even all of them are an unnecessary capability in domestic intelligence collection and 
analysis. Whether the National Network concept will be enough to glue the pieces together 
into a cohesive, credible layer of IC bureaucracy remains to be seen. The prevalence of 
terror attacks occurring in the homeland will play a role in determining whether they are 
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252 Ibid., 28–9. 
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even necessary, or on the other hand, capable of preventing crime and terrorism at all. It 
may well come down to a Darwinian fight for survival for each independent fusion center 
at the state and local level, especially for states that do not believe they exhibit a high or 
moderate risk for terrorism. Whether or not adopting an “all-hazards” or “all-threats” 
mission statement can prevent them from falling into the basket of “wasteful-government-
spending” or irrelevancy seems doubtful. This danger is exactly why state and local fusion 
centers need to strive to demonstrate capability, competence, and importance to their peer 
organizations, for they most likely occupy the best position to prevent the next domestic 
terrorist attack that originates from within the homeland.  
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